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Abstract 
This paper examines the relationship between CEO compensation and networks of 
executive and non-executive directors and is based on a sample of virtually all – 2991 - 
listed UK companies over the period 1996 to 2007. Networks may be an important 
informal corporate governance device. We analyze whether networks are built for reasons 
of information gathering or for the accumulation of managerial power. We capture the 
networks based on director interlocks and investigate these professional networks on both 
the director and company level. We find that direct networks are created for managerial 
power accumulations, that indirect networks can be used for information collection, and 
that both network types enable the CEO to obtain a higher compensation. However, only 
stronger managerial power networks harm the efficiency of the remuneration schemes in 
that the performance sensitivity is lower. Our networks on the company level gives 
evidence of busy boards which may reduce directors’ monitoring effectiveness. Our 
unique dataset also provides detailed information about the role of remuneration 
consultants: hiring experienced remuneration consultant with large client networks leads 
to higher CEO compensation in larger firms.  
 
 
Keywords: Executive remuneration, Social networks, Corporate Governance, 
Remuneration consultants.  
JEL codes: G3, J3, L14. 
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1. Introduction 
“The practice of interlocking directorates is the root of many evils. It offends 
laws human and divine." ... "Applied to corporations which deal with each other 
it tends to disloyalty and to violation of the fundamental law that no man can 
serve two masters. In either event it tends to inefficiency; for it removes incentive 
and destroys soundness of judgment. It is undemocratic for it rejects the 
platform: 'A fair field and no favors' " (Louis Dembitz Brandeis, 1914)1   
Social networks govern our lives; they are established through common education, sports 
interests, club memberships, as well as connections resulting from our professional lives. 
The economics and finance literature has started to give attention to the influence of 
managers’ and non-executive directors’ connections on corporate decision making and 
corporate monitoring. Indeed, it may be that informal aspects of corporate governance 
through social networks have a bigger impact on corporate policy than we anticipated and 
even influence the functioning of institutionalized governance structures (such as boards 
of the directors) or the role of governance regulation.  
Recent research shows that networks permeate the efficiency of economic decision 
making. For instance, Seidel, Polzer and Stewart (2000) document social ties’ strong 
impact on the wage negotiations of members of minorities. The discriminating effect 
against minority groups in the recruiting process of US high-tech companies is 
dramatically reduced when minority members are referred to the firm through a 
connection working in the company. Educational networks of mutual fund managers 
seem to influence their investment decisions (Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy, 2008a): they 
are more likely to invest in firms managed by people who had studied at the same 
university and the investment in connected firms performs better. Cohen, Frazzini and 
Malloy (2008b) document the impact of sell-side analysts’ social networks on their 
ability of collecting superior information. They find that analysts perform better on their 
                                                 
1 Brandeis was Associate Justice on the US Supreme Court and made this statement before the passing of 
the Clayton Act (1914) which prohibited extensive director networks that as these could lead to collusion in 
concentrated industries. The quote appeared in the US House of Representatives Staff Report to the 
Antitrust Committee (1965:3). 
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stock recommendation if they have education connections with the company’s directors. 
Hochberg et al. (2007) conclude that venture capital (VC) funds' performance is 
positively affected by the influence of the network positions enjoyed by the VC’s parent 
firms. Whereas these papers are examples of the benefits of social networks, networks 
may also have a detrimental effect on corporate decision making. For instance, Kuhnen 
(2009) identifies the effect of a fund’s director social network on the hiring and 
contracting decision of advisors to US mutual funds. If the candidate advisor was 
connected to the fund’s director through past business relationships, he/she was more 
likely to be appointed and paid a higher management fee. The fact that returns of funds 
with advisors connected to the board of directors are significantly lower than the returns 
of funds without connections raises the question whether close connections are raising 
agency costs in corporate governance or not. 
 
This paper examines the role of director networks on the top manager’s compensation 
and the pay-setting process in the UK. It is important to note that, we will use the UK 
definition of a director who can be either an executive (manager, officer) or a 
non-executive director.2 Over the past 15 years, executive compensation has increased 
substantially at a pace significantly above inflation and above salary increases of 
employees. This phenomenon continued even during the recent financial crisis which 
caused the S&P’s 500 stock index to fall by 37.6% in 2008 when 75% of the CEOs in the 
2700 largest US companies received remuneration increases. Even in companies at the 
brink of bankruptcy, departing CEOs managed to enjoy huge severance package. One 
example is Angelo Mozilo who was the CEO of Countrywide Financial that was saved by 
the Bank of America in June 2008, and was given $188 million as a send-off package. 
And this event was not an exception3. In spite of academic doubts over the last decade 
about the efficiency of the remuneration contract design (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003), the 
                                                 
2 Executive directors are members of the board and exert a senior management position in the company (in 
the US, they would usually be called officers). The non-executive directors (in the US often called 
directors) are board members who are not involved in the daily management; they often are managers or 
bankers in other firms. 
3 Lesser examples includes Kerry Killinger, the ex-CEO of Washington Mutual, who departed with $44 
million in September when his company failed; Mack Whittle, who successfully left South Financial group 
with $18 million gold parachute several days before the company applied for federal loans, which would 
limit the executive pay. 
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public debate on top management remuneration only flares up in times of crises such as 
the corporate governance/accounting disclosure crisis of 2000-2003 and the recent 
financial crisis that started in 2007. Each time, the top management remuneration 
practices were blamed to provide flawed incentives (Hill 2006) inducing short-sighted 
corporate strategies, but curbing the remuneration practices has proven difficult as soon 
as the outrage toned down.   
 
The arguments from industry against curtailing managerial pay are usually that attracting 
talent necessitates adequate compensation as firms would otherwise lose their 
competitive edge. “We’re a very big bank, we employ 200,000 people around the world 
[…]. We have obviously got to pay our people appropriately. I think our customers will 
appreciate that people deserve a fair wage’ (Defiant bank gives its fat cats GBP 1.6 
billion bonuses, 2010 (Express.co.uk)). This is indeed the key question: is it the 
competitive market for managerial talent that sets the compensation contract or is the 
contracting process hijacked by the executive directors? In order to provide an (partial) 
answer this question we study the impact of the social networks of executive and 
non-executive directors while controlling for the traditional explanations of managerial 
pay and the pay-for-performance sensitivity such as shareholder control and board 
composition. Networks may be very valuable to the firm, which is hence reflected in the 
directors’ compensation for the following reasons: First, connections with (peer) 
companies through directorships enable a firm to gain access to business information 
prior to its public disclosure. Such information is especially interesting when a firm is 
planning strategic alliances, merger and acquisitions, expanding into new markets. Early 
notice of critical business changes allows the company to reconsider and adjust their own 
strategy in time. Second, directors with strong networks are or develop into reputable 
figures in the society with access to politicians, employers’ organizations, regulators. 
Third, a network may also reflect managerial talent and a director’s past business 
successes in other firms. Thus, a large network reflects a director’s reputation and can be 
viewed as the guarantee of an executive director’s quality to the firm interested in hiring 
him. So, for all these reasons, directors’ connections are valuable for a firm and may 
translate into higher compensation and/or different structures of compensation contracts. 
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Key is that the value of a director to a company depends on the informational advantage 
of the number and importance of these connections (reputation). Therefore, a company 
that is better connected may be able to pay its executive and non-executive directors 
better. We therefore call the positive relation between social networks on the firm and the 
individual director level and remuneration: the information-value hypothesis.  
 
From the examples on pay excesses given above, it has become clear that remuneration 
contracting may not be a mean to reduce agency problems but be turned into an agency 
problem itself if the remuneration contracting is controlled by the top management. 
Networked executive directors may accumulate more power and may establish a stronger 
negotiation position vis-à-vis the board (and the remuneration committee) such that 
executive directors are able to extract a more attractive compensation package. We label 
this relation the managerial power hypothesis.  
 
While several recent papers, such as Guedj and Barnea (2009) and Horton et al. (2009), 
relate pay to networks, this paper contributes to the network literature because of these 
strengths. First, we are able to distinguish between the managerial power hypothesis, 
which claims that CEOs set their own pay, and the information-value hypothesis, which 
states that connected CEOs deserve higher compensation because of the 
information-value of their social networks. We distinguish between the two hypotheses 
by calculating measures of direct links (which proxy for managerial power) and indirect 
links (which mainly capture the potential of executives to collect information). 
Furthermore, we calculate the strength of networks at the individual director level and at 
the company level. Second, in addition to the degree and (normalized) closeness 
measures used in the literature, we employ (normalized) betweenness and eigenvector 
centrality to capture different aspects (such as the direct and indirect nature) of networks. 
Third, whereas most papers on networks employ cross-sectional data or data on a subset 
of companies (which hampers the concept of network measurement), we have gathered a 
large data panel consisting of virtually all listed UK companies for a 12 year period 
(1996-2007), amounting to firm years. Fourth, we control for the role of networks of 
remuneration consultants as well as internal and external corporate governance devices 
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(shareholder voting concentration, board structure and composition, CEO characteristics 
and corporate performance. 
 
Our empirical analysis based on random effect model generates several insightful results:  
First, we use direct centrality measure to capture managerial power resulting from 
director networks. We find indeed that higher direct centrality scores on the CEO level 
explain the CEO’s larger compensation packages and lower sensitivity, which supports 
our managerial power hypothesis. We use indirect centrality measures to evaluate the 
CEO’s access to information and resources valuable to his company. The indirect 
networks are translated into larger remuneration for the CEO but do not have an impact 
on his pay-for-performance sensitivity.  
 
Second, on the company level, we use the direct centrality measures to test the busy 
board hypothesis. Our results are in line with the hypothesis that companies with a higher 
direct centrality score (which signifies that directors are active in other firms and may 
hence be less effective monitors of the firm) over-pay their CEOs. Likewise, indirect 
centrality measures capture the company’s access to valuable information and resources. 
We find companies with better information access pay out a lower compensation to the 
CEO.  
 
Third, we also investigate whether the relations between performance measures and CEO 
compensation is influenced by the centrality measures of the CEO and the company. Our 
result shows the direct (managerial power) centrality score lowers the 
pay-for-performance sensitivity on both the CEO level as well the company level. While 
the indirect measures (information collection) do not influence the sensitivity. This 
provides further support for the managerial power hypothesis. 
 
We have controlled the centrality-CEO compensation relation for many CEO, board and 
company characteristics. For instance, we confirm that there are conflicts of interest when 
a CEO is a member of the remuneration committee because his compensation is then 
significantly higher. The size of the remuneration consultant network increases CEO 
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compensation, especially in large firms. The proportion of non-executive directors and 
female directors increase CEO total compensation 
 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature and formulates the 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes how networks are measured and calculates the centrality 
measures. Section 4 shows the methodology and summarizes the summary statistics. 
Section 5 discusses the results while section 6 expands on the robustness checks. Section 
7 concludes.  
 
2. The literature and hypotheses 
 
2.1 Social Network hypotheses  
The optimal remuneration contracting view has been challenged by the rapid increase in 
managerial compensation and the lack of pay-for-performance. A CEO can influence his 
remuneration contract when he can exert power on the board, when directors are on each 
others’ remuneration committees which could lead to collusion, when non-executive 
directors are nominated by a dominant CEO whom they cannot oppose, when shareholder 
ownership concentration is weak. We study this managerial power (Bebchuk, Fried and 
Walker, 2002) or skimming (Bertrand and Mulainathan, 2001) view on compensation 
contracting, and focus – while controlling for shareholder control (Mehran, 1995) and 
board effectiveness (Yermack, 1996) – on the role of the influence of and interaction 
between executive and non-executive directors, in other words their social networks. In 
their theoretical paper, Conyon and Read (2006) model the relation between multiple 
directorships and shareholder value. While the authors recognize that accepting outside 
directorships can be beneficial for the firm as outside directorships can bring in skills, 
knowledge and experience, which may outweigh the opportunity cost, executive directors 
will opt for more outside directorships than what is optimal for their own company. 
The question is whether we can distinguish between networks that yield managerial 
power and those who are valuable in terms of information collection. We therefore focus 
first on (normalized) centrality measures of the direct connections: the degree and 
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eigenvector centrality which capture the power of the directors (the links of vertices in 
the local region of the graph) (details on the calculation are given below). We 
hypothesize that: 
H1 CEOs with stronger networks (measured by direct links) can exert managerial power 
reflected in higher total compensation and compensation packages that are less 
performance sensitive (managerial power hypothesis).The value of the ‘managerial 
power’ networks declines in the presence of a board with more non-executive directors 
and of stronger shareholder power.   
 
Guedj and Barnea (2009) calculate the core centrality measures and show that CEO 
salary augments with the network size while controlling for corporate governance 
measures, CEO characteristics, and industry fixed-effects. This result supports their 
reputation hypothesis: when directors are connected, they soften their monitoring of the 
CEO, which leads to CEO compensation increases. This is also in line with the essence of 
the managerial power argument. Kirchmaier and Kollo (2007)’s research is conducted on 
outside directors on a small sample of the largest UK firms. Well-connected outside 
CEOs have better chance to be appointed, and their compensation is higher, mostly 
driven by the larger proportion of equity-based part. Brown et al. (2009) measure the 
networks of a large cross-section of UK companies and broaden the (current and past) 
professional network by connections through education, social activities (golf club, 
charity organizations, etc). They find a positive relation between CEO social network 
centrality and total compensation and an inverse relation between centrality and 
pay-for-performance sensitivity, which also corroborates the managerial power 
hypothesis. Larcker et al. (2006) present an analysis with new director network 
measurements. They develop network measures to distinguish between friendly links and 
independent connections. They show that short friendly links are positively related to 
CEO compensation but that operating performance is negatively correlated with director 
connections. This also is in line with the managerial power hypothesis.  
Director networks can have many advantages at the level of information collection. Early 
access to information can give a company a competitive advantage. Such networks may 
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enable firms to develop effective strategies to build strategic alliances, attract new 
sources of financing, influence regulation. Therefore, we expect that the value of these 
networks is reflected in the value of the compensation and its composition. The value of 
connectedness in terms of information can be measured by the centrality measures: 
(normalized) closeness and betweenness. The former captures how close a director 
(vertex) to all other vertices. The latter measures or how frequently a vertex is on the 
geodesic (shortest) path between any other pair of vertices. Once information emerges 
and spreads over the paths in the director networks, a director with a high closeness and 
betweenness has high information collection ability (for details: see section on centrality 
measures). We hypothesize:  
H2 CEO compensation increases with his access to information as approximated by his 
network centrality defined on indirect links. The value of this information-network is 
reflected in a higher compensation and higher pay-for-performance sensitivity 
(information-value hypothesis). The value of the information-driven network declines is 
independent of a board with more non-executive directors and of stronger shareholder 
power.   
Crespi-Cladera and Pascual-Fuster (2008) analyze the correlation between executive 
director’s pay and the network activity in a unique dataset of Spanish companies in the 
electronic sector. Not only closeness positively affects director compensation but so does 
betweenness. So, the authors provide some evidence that CEO compensation also reflects 
the information collection value of networks. Likewise, Horton, Millo and Serafeim 
(2009) calculate closeness and the dyadic constraint and find that executives’ network 
centrality is positively associated with their compensation. Executives seem to be 
rewarded for the resources they bring to a firm through their networks, while 
non-executive directors whose connections are more constrained earn higher 
compensation since their relative isolation may be perceived as an indication of their 
independence and superior monitoring capabilities.  
 
We can also calculate networks at the company level instead of the director level, in 
which case we examine the links between companies (through their directors). If the 
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company has a strong network, it may be less well run as non-executive directors may be 
less time to spend effort on monitoring their firm and the executive directors’ focus is 
dispersed. (Fich, and Shivdasani, 2006; Malmendier and Tate, 2009) Consequently, the 
governance of companies with many direct links may be deficient which may lead to a 
non-optimal compensation contract. Hallock (1997) analyses mutual interlocks between 
firms through employee and CEO connections. He demonstrates concludes that CEOs of 
interlocked companies earn on average a significantly higher basic salary and bonus than 
non-interlocked ones. He concludes (as do Fich and White, 2002) that board interlocks 
harm corporate governance efficiency and result in high CEO compensation. We 
therefore hypothesize:  
 
H3 In companies with a strong network by means of many direct links, the CEO’s total 
compensation is higher with a lower pay-for-performance sensitivity (busy board 
hypothesis). 
 
If the company as a whole has good access to information throughout its directors’ 
networks based on indirect links and does not depend on the CEO’s network alone, there 
is no need to remunerate the CEO for his network such that we expect: 
 
H4 The company network information collection based on the indirect links of its 
directors negatively affects the size of CEO compensation package and improves the 
pay-for-performance sensitivity. 
 
2.2 Controlling for other determinants of CEO compensation  
 
Besides the directors’ networks, CEO compensation may be jointly determined by 
corporate performance, the role of remuneration consultants, specific CEO characteristics 
such as tenure, board composition, the ownership concentration by shareholder type, and 
some other characteristics such as firm size or industry.  
 
Remuneration consultants 
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Remuneration consultants have the best access to remuneration information in current 
market and may hence be influential in setting the remuneration policy of specific 
companies but even of an industry if their advice is implemented in their network of 
clients. Through its remuneration consultant, a firm A may gain access has access to the 
remuneration practice in his peer companies. The impact of hiring a remuneration 
consultant on the remuneration policy of firm A can be twofold. A sudden increase in the 
remuneration in a firm B belonging to a specific remuneration consultant’s network of 
clients may be quickly copied to the other clients (including A) of the consultant who 
hence spreads the information on the raising of the remuneration benchmark (as applied 
in B). In contrast, remuneration consultants may advice that the remuneration package be 
based on objective standards and benchmarks such which attenuates the upward spiral in 
compensation. Recent analyses seem to support that remuneration consultants are driving 
compensation up: Conyon, Peck and Sadler (2009), who investigate the compensation 
consultants and executive pay in the US and the UK, conclude that CEO compensation is 
indeed larger and includes more equity-based compensation when a remuneration 
consultant is hired. Kabir and Minhat (2010) go one step further and report that CEOs’ 
equity-based compensation in the UK linearly increases the more remuneration 
consultant a firm hires. Moreover, the more market share these remuneration consultants 
have, the higher the CEOs’ remuneration in the firms they advice. The authors conclude 
that competition between remuneration consultants drives executive compensation up. 
 
CEO characteristics  
A CEO with a longer tenure is likely to obtain a higher remuneration package to 
compensate him for his company-specific human capital. Furthermore, his long 
experience may also make him more competitive on the managerial labour market 
(Murphy, 1986). CEOs with long tenure may be more entrenched and thus have more 
influence on their remuneration. This will be especially the case if he has a longer tenure 
than most non-executive directors and if he has served on compensation and 
remuneration committees. We use the CEO’s age to proxy CEO for his overall 
experience (possibly acquired on several companies). Thus, we expect that older CEOs 
and CEOs with longer tenure receive higher pay.  
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Only rarely, women are leading listed companies: female top managers occupy only 
3-5% of the (executive) board seats in listed US and the UK firms. Apart from evidence 
of a glass ceiling, women managers also seem to be discriminated against in terms of 
salary. For instance, Bertrand and Hallock (2001) find the female top executives are 
earning 45% less than their male colleagues in large American companies. Kulich et al. 
(2010) confirm that only 3% of the executive board members are female in all listed 
firms in the UK and they receive a lower remuneration than their male counterparts. In 
addition, their compensation contracts also differ from that of their male counterparts: 
female managers’ remuneration packages are less performance sensitive as their 
compensation has less upward potential in case of good corporate performance but they 
lose less in case of poor performance.  
 
Although combining the functions of CEO and chairman are discouraged in the current 
UK Combined Code, we still find many such cases, though predominantly in small and 
medium-sized companies. We expect that CEOs who also assume the tasks of a chairman 
have higher remuneration to compensate him for the extra task but also because this CEO 
will be in a more powerful position vis-à-vis the other (non-executive) directors (Conyon 
and Peck, 1998). The conflicts of interest even augment when the CEO is also a member 
of the nomination committee which allows him to appoint friends as new board members 
or when he is a member of the remuneration committee. We also control for the notice 
period included in the CEO’s employment contract. This lowers the level of total 
compensation needed to attract the CEO. 
 
Board characteristics 
Board composition has often considered as one of the critical measure for corporate 
governance effectiveness. A high proportion of nonexecutive directors, separation of the 
tasks of CEO and chairman, the creation of committees are expected to be important to 
turn the board into an effective governance device but the effectiveness of the board has 
not been overwhelming (Mehran, 1995). For instance, Franks, Mayer and Renneboog 
(2001) find that non-executives seem to support the executive directors in the UK even in 
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the wake of poor performance. Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) confirm the 
hypothesis on the negative relation between higher CEO pay and board independence.  
More recent research for the US by Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2008) indicates that 
CEO compensation decreases in firms that comply with the new and stricter board 
structure regulations imposed on listed firms by the NYSE and NASDAQ in 2002-03. In 
our regression analysis, if the company has a larger percentage of nonexecutives on the 
board, we expect the excessive CEO compensation can be restrained. 
 
Share stake concentration 
A key aspect of corporate governance is the monitoring role exerted by major 
shareholders (Core et al., 1999). The executive directors owning shares in their firm will 
have better their interest more aligned with those of the other shareholders which may 
lead to more modest compensation packages. This will also be the case with major share 
blocks held by non-executive directors (whose fiduciary obligations to monitor are now 
enhanced by voting power) and by outside shareholders such as corporations, individuals 
and families and institutional investors. Given that most blockholders belonging to the 
last category are rather passive owners, we expect their presence to have little effect on 
setting the CEO compensation. Corporations and individuals owning major blocks are 
expected to curb compensation (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001).4 
 
Firm characteristics 
Company size has been shown to explain most of the cross-sectional variation in total 
managerial compensation (Murphy, 2000; Core et al., 1999). Larger companies are 
paying their CEOs substantially more than medium-sized and small companies as it takes 
specific (and rare) managerial talent to lead large corporations which also entails larger 
responsibilities. Therefore, we also expect CEO compensation increases with firm size. 
 
Including corporate performance-related incentives in the remuneration contracts is key 
in the classic principal and agent frame work (Grossman and Hart, 1983). Neither 
                                                 
4 Conyon and Muldoon (2008) measure networks of shareholders and find the evidence shows that the 
ownership and control world is small in the sense that the geodesic path length is small compared to the 
number of vertices in the largest connected component. 
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accounting nor stock market performance measures are prefect benchmarks. The former 
are backward looking and are liable to manipulation by the management in order to 
augment their bonus compensation (Healy, 1985, Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006). 
Although employing stock prices as the yardstick has the advantage of a focus on (future) 
value creation, this may induce a biased short-term focus. Frequent overvaluation and 
undervaluation due to market sentiment may enable management to take decisions that 
cater to this sentiment while aiming at maximizing variable pay. Hence, we will use both 
types of performance measures in our models. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) and 
Renneboog and Trojanowski (2005) show that the benchmarks chosen in the 
remuneration contracts depends on the relative power of the management; they claim that 
management without principals prefers accounting benchmarks and is frequently not 
remunerated for their intrinsic quality but is paid for luck. Therefore, we expect that the 
CEO total compensation, salary, bonus and equity-based compensation are sensitive to 
the company’s performance, measured by both accounting and stock market 
performance. 
 
It may take a CEO with specific human capital to manage a firm with a high level of 
riskiness. A risk-averse CEO may demand a higher remuneration or a 
pay-for-performance relation embedded in the contract to compensate him for managing 
a firm with more volatile cash flows or with a higher probability of entering into financial 
distress. Therefore, we collect data on stock price 
 
3. Capturing Networks 
 
3.1. The network definitions 
 
To quantify directors’ networks, we resort to several graph-theoretical measures. Figure 
N1 depicts the director network surrounding Andy Hornby, the CEO of HBOS plc, a 
banking and insurance company. Directors in HBOS plc are the dark grey circles at the 
right bottom corner. In 2006, Andy Hornby was also a non-executive director in the life 
assurance and unit trust company St. James's Place plc (whose board members are 
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represented by light grey circles at the top right corner), and in the retail companies GUS 
plc and Home Retail Group plc5 (whose directors are in dark and light circles in the left 
bottom corner). This example is a fragment of a complete director network whereby a 
director is denoted by a vertex (or node). A connection between two vertices is called link 
(or edge, tie). The system contains vertices and links between them is a graph (or map). 
As links between two vertices are established when two directors are sitting on the same 
board, Andy Hornby’s four directorships create connections with 38 directors. Besides 
Andy Hornby, HBOS and St. James's Place shared another two directors: Jo Dawson and 
James Crosby. Jo Dawson was an executive director in HBOS and a non-executive 
director in St. James's Place. James Crosby was the CEO in HBOS before Andy Hornby 
and a non-executive director. Similarly, GUS and Home Retail Group shared three 
directors, Oliver Stocken, John Coombe and Terry Duddy. Oliver Stocken was a 
non-executive director in GUS and became chairman of the board in Home Retail Group. 
John Coombe used to be a nonexecutive director in GUS and became senior 
nonexecutive director in Home Retail Group. Terry was an executive director in GUS and 
the CEO in Home Retail Group.  
 
[Insert Figure N1 about here] 
 
A sequence between two vertices, visiting no vertices more than once, is called a path. In 
the above graph, there exist multiple paths between John Peace and Richard Ashton. For 
example: Peace – Duddy – Ashton, Peace – Stocken – Ashton, Peace - Coombe – Hughes 
– Ashton and etc. The length of a path is the number of links it comprises and a geodesic 
path is the shortest path between two vertices (which is not necessarily unique). The 
length of the geodesic path is the graph-theoretical distance (the number of links in the 
geodesic path). In the above example, both Peace – Duddy – Ashton and Peace – Stocken 
– Ashton are paths with length 2. As is no path between Peace and Ashton with distance 
smaller than 2, both paths with length 2 are geodesic paths. In contrast, the path Peace - 
Coombe – Hughes – Ashton has a distance of 3, and is hence not a geodesic path. 
                                                 
5 GUS plc split into Home Retail Group plc and Experian plc in 2006. Therefore, the two companies in the 
left bottom corner were not completely independent from each other. 
 15 
Another concept is a step. Duddy and Stocken are one step away from Peace, while 
Ashton and Hughes are two steps away from Peace. In Figure N1, the vertices have 
circles of different sizes, which are determined by the number of connections (which is 
also called the degree). This number of links possessed is one of the most common 
measures to evaluate how central the director is in the graph.   
 
3.2 Measures of Centrality 
 
In order to illustrate the calculation of various centrality measures, we construct a 
network (Figure N2) with six companies and ten directors in the table below where the 
number refers to the name of the firms and the letter stands for the directors’ names 
(Table N1, Panel A). If two directors are sitting on the same board, they are linked, which 
is expressed in Figure N2. In order to compute the centrality measures, we represent the 
network as a symmetric matrix, where 1 denotes a link between the two directors and 0 
does not (Panel B). This matrix enables us to calculate the centrality measures which are 
summarized in Panel D. 
 
[Insert Figure N2 and Table N1 about here] 
 
The degree centrality of a vertex is calculated as the number of links of vertex. In the 
above example, the number of links for vertex is 6, so director A has degree centrality of 
6 (as can be seen from Panel A of Table N1. The degree centrality can also be normalized 
by dividing the number of links by the total network size (the total number of vertices in 
graph with exception of the vertex A).  
The closeness of a vertex is defined as the sum of geodesic distances between this vertex 
and all other vertices that can be reached. To calculate closeness, we transform the link 
matrix of Panel B into the geodesic distance matrix by replacing all the zeros by the 
geodesic distance (Panel C), which is possible for all the nodes because we have a 
connected graph. In a non-connected graph, closeness measure is sometimes normalized 
by dividing the sum of geodesic distance by the number of reachable vertices. Then the 
sum, of the rows (columns) is the closeness centrality. Another way to define closeness 
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(also used in closeness normalization) is to calculate the inverse of the sum of all 
geodesic paths from node v to any other vertex t:  
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In this formula, the closeness centrality of vertex v (Cc(v)) is equal to the one divided by 
the sum of the lengths of geodesic paths (dG) from v to any other vertex t. 
 
The betweenness of vertex v is defined as the sum of its betweenness ratios, which are 
defined as the number of geodesic paths from vertex s to vertex t passing through vertex 
v, divided by the number of geodesic paths from s to t. In the above example, no geodesic 
path needs to pass vertex c, therefore the betweenness score is zero. Vertex b has a high 
betweenness score, since b is the only vertex adjacent to c and there is only one path from 
c to b. In this case, the number of geodesic paths between any vertices (except for b) and 
c passing b is equal to the number of geodesic paths between any vertices and c. Thus, 
vertex b has many betweenness ratios equal to 1 (which is the highest value of a 
betweenness ratio). The betweenness score, which is the sum of all betweenness ratios, is 
hence high for vertex b. In formula form, this is:  
 
where the denominator is the number of geodesic paths from vertex s to vertex t, the 
numerator is the number of geodesic paths from s to t with vertex v on the geodesic path. 
The betweenness can be normalized by dividing it by the maximum number of pairs of 
vertices not including k.  
 
Eigenvector centrality of vertex v (CE(v)) equals to the sum of all adjacent vertices’ 
eigenvector centrality scores:  
 
 
This calculation process begins with assigning score 1 to all the vertices. At each 
iteration, the score of vertex v is calculated as the sum of all adjacent vertices’ scores 
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received in the previous iteration. In the above formula, the matrix A is an adjacent 
matrix capturing whether any vertex j is adjacent to the target vertex v. Therefore, the 
centrality score for each vertex evolves after every iteration. The factor   is to make 
sure that the centrality scores converge rather than explode after several iterations. The 
advantage of eigenvector centrality over other centrality measures is that it not only 
captures the fact how many vertices are linked to the target vertex (degree), but also 
includes the network importance of those linked vertices (the degree of these linked 
vertices). A vertex has a higher eigenvector centrality score if it is connected to more 
vertices with higher scores. 
 
Panel D of Table N1 presents the different centrality measures for the directors in the 
above example. In sum, degree, closeness, betweenness and eigenvector centrality are the 
four measures we use to measure the network centrality of our network graph. We can 
categorize degree and eigenvector centrality measures and their normalized versions as 
measures of direct links or direct measures. Closeness and betweenness plus the 
normalizations are regarded as measures of indirect connections or indirect measures. In 
the hypothesis section (see below), we state that networks designed to capture managerial 
power and those established for information collection can be measured by different 
types of centrality measures. Measures of direct links comprise degree and eigen vector 
centrality in the test of managerial power in director networks. Centrality measures 
capturing indirect links (closeness and betweenness) are used to measure the access to 
information through networks. As each vertex is representing a director, companies can 
also be viewed as being connected to each other through the directors who sit on the 
boards of both companies. To calculate the company network centrality, each company is 
a vertex in the graph and two companies are linked if they share at least one common 
director. Once the graph for company level networks is drawn, the centrality calculation 
is identical as that on the director level. In the context of this paper, it is also interesting 
to calculate networks for remuneration consultants. We identify all the clients advised by 
each consultant and then use the number of clients as a measure for the information 
access of that consultant.  
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N.3 Sample description: director networks 
 
On average, the degree of a listed British company is 4, which means that there are 4 
cross-directorships with a median of 3 (Table S1). The closeness measure is defined over 
all the connected vertices in the graph (which entails that all isolated vertices do not have 
a closeness measure). Whereas a higher degree signifies that a company is better 
connected, greater closeness implies that the company is further from the center of the 
graph. However, due to the inverse transformation, normalized closeness has opposite the 
interpretation: a higher normalized closeness indicates being more close to all vertices of 
the graph, or less distance to all other companies. The distribution of eigenvector and 
betweenness centrality measures are skewed, which means that a small proportion of 
companies (mostly the largest companies) are very well connected.  
 
[Insert Table S1 about here] 
 
Table S2 exhibits the annual centrality measures over the sample period 1996 to 2007. 
All centrality measures indicate that the connectedness of British companies increased 
slightly at the beginning of our sample period (1996-1999), then remained stable until 
2004 when we observe a minor decline in the degree of connectedness. When we 
partition the sample companies according to size as reflected by index membership 
(FTSE 100, FTSE 250, FTSE SmallCap, and FTSE Fledging), we observe in Table S3 
that larger firms have remarkably more links (degree) than other companies. The 
closeness measure confirms that larger firms are more closely related to all the companies 
in our sample than the members of the other indices. The eigenvector centrality measure 
shows that FTSE 100 companies are at more important positions in the network than are 
FTSE 250, Smallcaps and Fledglings. Lastly, the betweenness measures indicate that 
larger firms are more likely to be on any geodesic path in the graph. In practice, this 
implies that they are usually at the important junctions in the networks.  
 
[Insert Table S2, S3 about here] 
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In order to understand more about the evolution of director networks in the UK, we 
employ additional network statistics to describe the yearly network graphs (Table S4). As 
the number of companies increases over time in our sample, the total number of links 
between companies increases as well, as shown by the increasing value in N link (number 
of links). However, the density of the graph, which is calculated as the number of links 
divided by the number of all possible links, decreases over time. This implies the 
companies in more recent years are less connected. The whole network graph comes 
sparser but counts more vertices. Let us now focus on the graphs’ components, which are 
the number of vertices (e.g. companies) that are directly or indirectly connected with each 
other. We consider components of a size equal to at least three as important components. 
Table 5.4 exhibits that the number of components with more than three companies 
(NC>3) increases steadily overtime. The size of the largest component (Max C) in every 
year increases for most of the years. We can therefore conclude that, as time passes, a 
growing proportion of companies opts not to be linked into the largest component, but to 
establish their own components.  
 
[Insert Table S4 about here] 
 
Table S5 considers the network structures by sector for the year 2007. The differences 
between sectors are remarkable. On average, companies from the financial, IT and 
medical sector are more connected than other sectors. However, these three sectors have 
different network structural features. In the financial sector, most companies are 
connected with each other through a gigantic component (including 75 companies), and 
only a few smaller coalitions exist (See Figure N3a). In the IT industry (Figure N3b), 
companies are likely to be linked to other companies in their sector, but the networks are 
smaller and a dominating component is absent. Although the size of the subsample of IT 
firms is similar to that of the financial sector, the size of largest component in IT sector is 
only one third of that in financial sector. The IT sector has many more median-large size 
components than the financial sector (13 versus 5).  
 
[Insert Table S5 about here] 
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In the above discussion, we focused on corporate networks on the basis of directorships 
but in the context of managerial compensation policies it is also important to study 
whether firms are connected by employing the same remuneration consultant. Those 
connections may imply that information and insights on remuneration policies in other 
firms are more easily dissipated. The statistics of Table S6 indicate that many companies 
– mainly small firms and midcaps - do not hire external remuneration advisors. There 
have been 145-198 remuneration consultants active at anyone year. Over time, we 
observe an increasing trend of hiring a remuneration consultant. In the midst of our 
sample period (2002), a company is on average connected with more than 40 other 
companies through remuneration advisors. However, in the most recent years, on the 
average each company is linked with less than 40 companies through remuneration 
consultants. From 2003 onwards, we observe a trend reversal, which may be due to the 
fact that more remuneration consultants are more active in the market or that shareholders 
more frequently demand an explanation for valuable compensation packages of top 
management. 
 
4. Data and Methodology  
 
4.1 Estimation methods 
As our main estimation method, we employ a random effects GLS regression. Regarding 
the choice between fixed effects versus random effects models, we opt for the latter for 
three reasons. Whereas a fixed effect model assumes that each individual 
company/director has a unobservable individual effect, a random effect model considers 
these individual effects as random deviations from a mean individual effect. Therefore, 
random effect model requires a large enough cross-section of a data panel relative to the 
sample period’s length, which is satisfied in our sample of 12 years and at least one 
thousand companies in a year. In a fixed effect model, every subject’s individual effect 
enters as a parameter in the regression model, which is avoided in the random effect 
model as the individual effects result from a draw from a random distribution. Random 
effects models have hence a higher number of degrees of freedom which gives the 
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random effect model a higher efficiency. Another advantage of the random effect model 
is that it a weighted average of between and within estimators. Compared to the fixed 
effect model which is based on within group estimator, random effect model thus also 
consider the differences between individual averages. Lastly, fixed effect model cannot 
estimate time-invariant variables, such as gender and position, which are important in our 
analysis. We find that the explanatory variables in virtually all model specifications are 
not correlated with the individual effects, as shown by the Hausman test. As this 
condition holds, a random effect model is econometrically a more efficient method in 
panel data estimation.  
 
We run the following two sets of regressions on:   
a. the level of the CEOs’ total compensation: 
CEO total compensation it = α + β1 × Performance measures it  
+ β2 × Network measures it  
+ β3 × CEO characteristics it 
+ β4 × Corporate governance measures it 
+ β5 × Ownership concentrationit 
+ β6 × Firm characteristics it 
+ 

12
1j
γj × Industry j + 

2007
1996t
δt × Time t 
The network measure included will be chosen based on the director network function we 
intend to test (managerial power or information collection). We will extend the analysis 
by replacing the above dependent variable by compensation sub-categories such as salary, 
fees, bonus and equity-based compensation. The performance measures consist of 
accounting performance (return on assets) and a stock performance measure (a 
market-adjusted return). CEO characteristics include the CEO’s gender, tenure, age, 
membership of committees (audit, nomination and remuneration), and the combination of 
the positions of CEO and chairman of the board. Board structure variables is important 
internal corporate governance controls. Ownership concentration consists of the 
percentage of block holdings by category of shareholder. We categorize all the share 
stakes held by directors and all the blocks of 3% more into the following shareholder 
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categories: (i) investment and mutual funds, (ii) insurance companies, (iii) pension funds, 
(iv) banks, (v) nominees accounts, (vi) individuals and families not related to a director, 
(vii) industrial and commercial companies, (viii) CEO, (ix) executive directors (excluding 
the CEO) and (x) non-executive directors. Categories (i) to (iv) constitute the institutional 
investors6 and classes (viii) to (x) make up the insider ownership. Lastly, we include 
some firm characteristics such as size, capital structure, and stock price volatility. All 
regressions include industry and time dummy variables. The industry composition in 
presented in Appendix C where Panel A shows the number of firm-years in each sector 
over the whole sample and Panel B shows the number of firms in each sector in 2007. In 
Panel A, the sectors comprising the highest number of firms are Support Services 
(10.75%), Software and Computer Services (8.52%), Travel and Leisure (6.53%), Media 
(5.98%) and General retailers (5.91%). Panel B shows that at the end of our sample 
period (2007), the largest sectors now also include the finance industry. Panel C 
condenses the number of sectors into 12 broad industries.   
 
Instead of the yearly time dummies, we include four indicator variables that could capture 
stock exchange trends: 1996-1997 (upward trend), 1998-1999 (strong boom prior to the 
bursting of IT bubble which dragged down the stock market early 2000), 2000-2003 
(stock market downturn), and 2004-2007 (recovery). A description of the variables and 
the data sources are given in Appendix A.  
 
b. The pay-for-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation 
Change in CEO compensation it = α + β1 × Performance measure it  
+ β2 × Network measure it  
+ β3 × Network measure it × Performance measure it 
+ β4 × CEO characteristics it 
+ β5 × Corporate governance variables it 
+ β6 × Ownership concentration it 
+ β7 × Firm characteristics it 
                                                 
6 The owners behind the nominees accounts are often also institutional investors (Franks, Mayer and 
Renneboog, 2001).  
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+ 

12
1j
γj × Industry j + 

2007
1996t
δt × Time t 
In the above pay-for-performance sensitivity regression, the change in the total 
compensation or a subcategory of compensation is the dependent variables, which may 
be partially explained by the interactions of performance and network centrality 
measures.  
 
An analysis of remuneration contracting should also be related to the examination of 
CEO departure and dismissal because disregarding the CEO turnover decision may cause 
sample selection problems in the remuneration analysis (Renneboog and Trojanowski, 
2005). When the analysis of changes in compensation only includes ‘surviving’ CEOs, 
the sample distribution is restricted which may lead to estimation biases. In order to study 
the compensation and turnover decision simultaneously, we also use the following 
Heckman sample selection method, also known as a type-2 Tobit model. 
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, where  itit 21  ,  are drawn from a bivariate normal distribution with mean 0, variances 
2
1  and 
2
2 , and covariance 12  (Amemiya, 1984).
i 1  and 2  are vectors of the 
model coefficients. In our models, i corresponds to a firm and t to a year. *itTurnover  and 
*
itonCompensati  are underlying latent variables that are not observable. However, the 
sign of the *itTurnover  variable can be observed and coded as a binary variable 
CEO_stayedit: if a CEO lost his or her job (i.e., 0
* itTurnover ) it is coded as 0, 
otherwise it is coded as 1. Obviously, compensation is only observed for CEOs who were 
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not dismissed. it1  and it2  are the sets of explanatory variables explaining CEO 
turnover and compensation, respectively. They include the measures enumerated above. 
The two sets of explanatory variables, i.e., itX1  and itX 2 , are not disjoint (they can 
differ, however).  
 
Throughout the paper we call Equation 1 the selection equation, while Equation 1 is the 
regression equation. The selection equation explains CEO turnover, i.e., 
1_ itstayedCEO  corresponds to those firm-years when the CEO keeps his or her 
position. The regression equation explains the compensation of these CEOs in the 
subsequent year. As the notion of compensation sensitivity to previous year performance 
is not meaningful for new CEOs, we restrict the remuneration analysis to CEOs with 
tenure of more than one year. Estimating the parameters of the regression Equation 1b on 
the basis of the non-turnover sample only, would not be a valid alternative to the 
proposed method because the OLS estimator of 2  is biased when the selection of the 
regression sample is endogenous (i.e., 012  ). 
 
4.2 Sample selection and data sources 
We have collected the data on the remuneration of executive and non-executive directors 
as well as detailed board information from Manifest.info7. There is on average annual 
information for 1154 companies. Other company-specific data including sector 
categorization, accounting information (including profit measures, capital structure and 
firm scale), stock performance and stock volatility, are gathered from Datastream 
Advance. Ownership data is jointly provided by Manifest.info, Thomson Financial, and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. Our dataset starts in 1996 (after the release of Greenbury 
Report on Managerial Compensation in 1995) and ends in 2007. It comprises most of the 
listed UK companies whose combined market value amounts to more than 99% of total 
market capitalization of the London Stock Exchange. The dataset comprises information 
                                                 
7 Manifest is an independent corporate governance and proxy voting specialist providing corporate 
governance and proxy data. More precisely, director’s annual remuneration information and board 
information are collected from Manifest.info. 
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on1758 companies8 on which we have 9789 firm-years. All sample companies are listed 
on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and comprise large, medium-sized, small caps, as 
well as tiny firms. Virtually all companies belong to one of these indices: FTSE 100, 
FTSE 250, FTSE Smallcap, FTSE Fledgling, and FTSEAIM. The FTSE 350 comprises 
both the FTSE 100 (which consists of the 100 biggest companies that represent about 
81% of the market capitalization of the whole LSE) and the FTSE 250 (which comprises 
the next 250 largest companies and represents about 15% of the UK market). FTSE 
Smallcap includes companies that are relatively small, and cover about 2% of the total 
LSE market value. We have also gathered data on firms included in the FTSE Fledgling 
index and FTSE AIM index, which are usually firms too small to be included in the 
FTSE All-Share index9. In sum, we have info on virtually the complete UK market. This 
fact is important in this context of network research as limiting the sample size to e.g. 
FTSE350 only would give a distorted picture of the networks exiting in UK listed firms.   
 
In case the length of the financial year deviates from the standard one year (it is then 
more than 30 days longer or shorter than 365), the remuneration and accounting 
information are adjusted accordingly to make sure they are comparable to other annual 
values. When a financial year is not coinciding with the calendar year, we apply this rule: 
e.g. we regard a financial year ending between January and June 31st 2005 as the year 
2004 whereas we consider a financial year ending between 1st July and 31st of December 
2005 as the year 2005.  
 
In this study, the CEOs are the main subjects. The number of firm-years for which we 
have data on the CEO remuneration amounts to 9789 and even to 13854 when we use a 
broader definition of the CEO (in case the CEO is absent, we consider the managing 
director or the executive chairman as CEO – details of the CEO identification procedure 
are given in Appendix B). The remuneration packages designed for the top managers are 
more complex than for other executives, these packages are more valuable and (ought to 
                                                 
8 In our regression analysis, we will include 1216 firms as for firms without interlocked directors, the 
centrality measures are not defined.   
9 FTSE All-Share can be seen as the aggregation of the FTSE 100, FTSE 250 and FTSE Small Cap 
Indices. It represents 98-99% of the UK market capitalization. FTSE AIM overlaps to some extent with 
FTSE Fledgling. 
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be) stronger related to firm performance. Hence, CEO’s remuneration is considered as the 
best epitome of remuneration practices.  
 
4.3 Remuneration data 
The total remuneration package of a director can be dissected into these sub-categories: 
(i) salary, (ii) fee, (iii) bonus, (iii) equity-based compensation (stock options and long 
term incentive plans), (v) miscellaneous remuneration, and (vi) other. The salary includes 
a fixed payment and is usually paid out in cash (and exceptionally in shares). Fees are 
usually paid for consulting and supervisory services rather than for operational work and 
are hence more often compensation for non-executive directors or former executive 
directors. The bonus can consist of cash or shares and is usually paid when specific 
benchmarks or targets were reached over the past year (or past few years). Bonuses can 
also be voluntarily deferred or are compulsorily deferred for a vesting period of usually 3 
years. In practice, the initial cash deferral bonus is often converted into stocks at 
favourable terms if the CEO commits to remain in his company or achieves some 
performance criteria over the vesting period. A deferred bonus realized in stock is 
recorded as restricted stocks and categorized as the equity-based compensation.10  
 
Equity-based compensation includes restricted shares and stock options. Restricted 
shares are granted to the management under different schemes such as shares 
appreciation rights and deferred bonus schemes. In most circumstances, the restricted 
shares cannot be sold until certain goals are reached or subsequent to a vesting period. 
Restricted shares are valued at the market price at the grant date. The market price at 
grant date was collected from Datastream Advance. Stock options give the CEOs the 
right to acquire company stocks at a predetermined price (exercise price). Stock options 
in the executive remuneration package in the UK have often vesting conditions 
(performance benchmark) and always vesting periods, typically 3 to 5 years. We value 
the stock options by means of the Black-Scholes option pricing formula. Most options are 
granted at the money; the market price and stock price volatility at the grant date are 
                                                 
10 In our dataset, we include the deferred bonus plans in cash terms at the grant date. All performance 
related sub-categories are recorded and valued at the grant date. 
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collected from Datastream Advance. As we are lacking no information about the time to 
maturity of stock options in the Manifest.info database, we use ten years (the usual time 
to expiration at the grant date) as the default maturity for all stock option value 
calculations. The interest rate of 10 years UK government bonds (GILTS) is used as the 
risk-free rate.  
 
Miscellaneous compensation includes compensation that is not paid out on a regular 
basis, and includes transaction bonuses, recruitment incentives, relocation expenses, and 
loss of office compensation. A transaction bonus is granted when the CEO has 
administrated major corporate transactions, such as mergers or acquisition or other types 
of asset restructuring. A deferred cash bonus (different from the deferred bonus defined 
above) is granted mainly with the aim of retaining the CEO. For instance, the CEO 
remains employed for the vesting period (typically 3-5 years) in order to claim this cash 
award (which is not performance-related). The recruitment incentive is paid when a 
position is difficult to fill without such an additional allurement and is associated only 
with new appointments. Relocation expenses are awarded in case the newly-appointed 
CEO needs to move near his new firm. The loss of office compensation is also known as 
severance pay (or golden parachute). When the contract is terminated before it expires, 
the CEO is compensated for this early departure. The payment of the severance pay is 
often not contractually specified and is often granted even the CEO is fired following 
poor performance. Our dataset also contains a remuneration category labeled ‘Other’, 
which is rare and includes all other forms of compensation and benefits that are not 
included in any of the above categories and comprises e.g. the CEO’s (medical) insurance 
costs paid for by the firm, some ‘ad hoc benefits’ and ‘unusual compensations’ about 
which the firms do not give detailed information. 
 
The Manifest.info dataset also contains some information about pension contributions 
done by the company for the benefit of executive directors. Given that this information 
does not seem complete, we excluded it from the calculation of the value of the total 
yearly compensation. 
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Table R1 and Figure R1 summarize remuneration for the whole sample period 1996 to 
2007.11 The most important components of a CEO’s compensation package in the UK 
are equity-based compensation (restricted shares and stock options), the fixed salary, and 
the bonus. On average, GBP 296,215 is paid to a CEO each year as equity-based 
compensation, which accounts for 44.8% of his total remuneration. The salary on average 
amounts to GBP 202,931 or 30.70% of the total remuneration. The bonus is also a 
significant source for a CEO’s wealth accumulation with an average of GBP 126,290 or 
19.11% of the total compensation. The remaining compensation components such as fees, 
miscellaneous compensation and other are only marginal and add up to a mere 5% of 
CEO compensation.  
 
[Insert Table R1, Figure R1 about here] 
 
How did the value of compensation packages evolve? Panel A of Table R2 and Figure R2 
shows a strong increase in the total remuneration which peaked in the year 2000 
(following the strong stock market boom that continued from the 1990s until 2000), was 
followed by a short-lived decrease in 2001-2002 (coinciding with the equity market 
decline and the collapse of the M&A market) and then kept rising till 2007. By 2007, the 
total remuneration for the CEO had almost doubled relative to its 1996 value. Over the 
entire sample period, the total remuneration increased at an average rate of 9.43% per 
annum. Panel A shows only modest increases in the fixed salary over time, but the 
augmentation of the bonus and equity-based compensation are striking as also reflected in 
the compensation structure. Particularly in 2000, when stock market peaked before the IT 
bubble burst, the equity-based compensation also became the most valuable aspect of a 
compensation package (amounting to 53.04% of the total remuneration). Panel B shows 
the inflation-adjusted remuneration values with 2007 as the base year and Panel C 
presents the median compensation values. Panel C hints that the distribution of CEO 
                                                 
11 The tables R1-R5 and the tables in appendix D describe the remuneration variables. The numbers in bold 
are unconditional figures (i.e. these statistics are based on the whole sample independent on whether or not 
a specific type of compensation has been granted) and the numbers in normal face are conditional figures 
(these statistics are calculated based on the occurrence of a specific type of compensation). Unconditional 
remuneration statistics provide a good overview of the population but provide little insight when there are 
only few observations for a specific type of compensation.  
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compensation is highly skewed: a small number of well paid CEOs (mostly from FTSE 
350) have driven up the average CEO compensation in the UK market. Figures R3 and 
R4 visualize the inflation-adjusted remuneration trends over the sample period. The 
figures confirm the strong increase in remuneration in 1999-2000, which is followed by a 
small and short-lived decline as from 2003 onwards, the compensation levels are again 
the 1999-2000 peak. The equity-based compensation is still a smaller part of the total 
remuneration of UK CEOs than that of US CEOs (where the proportion exceeds 50%). In 
2007, CEOs of S&P 500 companies were paid USD 13.4 million on average whereas UK 
CEOs of FTSE 100 companies on average received GBP 4.3 million (USD 8.6 million).  
 
[Insert Table R2, Figure R2a, R2b about here] 
 
In order to illustrate the differences in CEO compensation across sectors, we show the 
remuneration of the five most paid CEOs (and their averages) for each sector in 2007 
(Table R3). The table also includes information about CEO’s gender, age, tenure, 
turnover and chairmanships. We learn that the companies in the industries of Financial 
Services, Food Producing, Media, and Utilities reward their CEOs most generously. The 
highest paid CEO in 2007 was Bart Becht from the Reckitt Benckiser Group with a 
compensation of GBP 31 million, followed by Terence Leahy from Tesco’s earning GBP 
21 million. For each of these CEOs (and most other top earners), more than 80% of their 
remuneration package consists of equity-based compensation  
 
[Insert Table R3 about here] 
 
That there is positive relation between CEO remuneration and corporate size (here 
captured by stock exchange index membership) has been documented in many 
remuneration papers before. Partitioning the sample firms based on membership of the 
FTSE 100, FTSE 250, FTSE SmallCap and FTSE Fledgling, we find that the CEO 
remuneration of the largest firms (FTSE 100) is respectively about 10, 5 and 2.5 times 
larger than that of the fledglings, small caps and FTSE 250 firms (Table R5 and Figure 
R5). The growth in nominal salaries for the CEOs leading fledgings was 9.8% per 
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annum, but has even been stronger at about 19.5% annually for small caps and FTSE 250 
firms, and 15.3% for the largest firms. The details on compensation structure of executive 
and non-executive directors by firm size are presented in the tables of Appendix D. In 
sum, we first observe that directors, and particularly CEOs, are better compensated in 
larger companies. The CEOs in the FTSE100 companies are paid nearly ten times more 
than the CEOs in the FTSE Fledgling companies. Second, the structure of the 
compensation packages in large companies is markedly different than that of smaller 
companies. The bonus, restricted shares, and stock options form a larger proportion of the 
total executive directors’ compensation of larger companies (where is amounts to about 
70%). In the FTSE SmallCap and FTSE Fledgling companies, the proportion of the 
performance related compensation is down to less than 60% and 40% respectively. The 
difference in remuneration between companies from different indices is also reflected in 
the pay of the executive directors (excluding the CEO) and the nonexecutives. The 
executives in the FTSE 100 companies earn three times more than those of the FTSE 
SmallCaps and five times more than FTSE Fledgling companies. The differences in 
remuneration structure is also pronounced when comparing CEO income by index. For 
non-executive directors, the difference in fees also exists across firms belonging to 
different indices but is much less significant. Executive directors employed by a FTSE 
100 firm earn on average ₤73,483 annually, which is about three times the pay received 
by the average nonexecutive director working for FTSE Fledgling companies (₤27,581). 
Regardless the size of the company, the compensation of the non-executive director is 
always dominated by his fee, which is a fixed compensation, and is usually stable during 
for non-executive’s stay in office. Third, executive compensation increases significantly 
above inflation (with annual growth rates of more than 15%) and the proportion of 
performance-based compensation, i.e., bonus and equity-based compensation rises even 
faster. 
 
[Insert Table R5, Figure R5 about here] 
 
4.4 CEO, board and firm characteristics  
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A CEO’s age averages to about 53 years. While this average age remains relatively stable 
over time, the average tenure declines from 8.7 years in 1996 to 4.9 years in 2007 (Table 
T1). Executive directors are somewhat younger than the nonexecutive directors, 50 and 
58 years respectively. This age and trend in tenure also persists in firms of different sizes 
and sectors - only the CEOs in the largest companies have a shorter than average tenure. 
Age and tenure data will enable to test whether remuneration depends on experience. In 
line with the findings on the gender of top management in other countries, we find that 
the top managerial market in the UK is dominated by male managers (Table T1). 
Although the proportion of female CEOs has slightly increased over time (from 0.8% in 
1996 to 2.6% in 2007), the vast majority of CEOs is male.  
 
[Insert Table T1, Figure T1 about here] 
 
Across our sample period, CEO turnover amounts to 23.75% which includes 1.1% 
turnover resulting from the decease of the CEO and 10.4% ‘forced’ turnover (Panel A of 
Table T2). Given that the true reason behind the turnover is not available – most firms 
seem to use euphemistic terms to describe the CEOs departure - we distinguish between 
natural turnover and forced turnover. The former type of turnover comprises the 
departure of CEOs who are 63 years old and above (and hence near the retirement age) 
whereas we label the latter type as forced. We also collect information on the CEOs 
contract such as the notice period. Panel B shows that more than three quarters of the 
CEOs (77%) are required to hand in their notice twelve months prior to their intended 
departure. For about 12%, the notice period is longer than 20 months. Figure T1 depicts 
that turnover is stable relative stable over our 12-year time period but disciplinary 
turnover declines since 2000 from 15% to 7% in 2007.  
 
[Insert Table T2 about here] 
 
On average, the board comprises 8 directors of which 5 are non-executives (Table 3, 
Panel A). Merely 4% of the board members are female. In 13.1% of the firm-years, the 
CEO also chairs the board of directors. Given that such board duality could harm the 
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independence of the board’s supervision, the UK Combined Code discourages the 
combination of the tasks of CEO and chairman. In this context, an average of 13.1% over 
our sample companies and the period 1996-2007 is rather high. While board duality is 
rare in the FTSE100 firms (3 out of 105 in 2007), it is more frequent in smaller firms (6 
out of 86 for FTSE Fledgling companies in 2007). There is however a significant decline 
in board duality over time: in 1996, 21.0% of the CEOs had also summed the tasks of 
chairman while this number dropped to 7.0% by 2007.  
 
[Insert Table T3 about here] 
 
The Combined Code also requires that a firm instates audit, nomination, and 
remuneration committees. In the context of the functioning and independence of these 
committees, it is important that these committees be staffed by non-executive directors. 
We investigate to which extent the CEO and other executive directors are present on 
these committees. Most companies, with exception of a fraction of the very small firms, 
comply with the UK corporate governance code and have audit (98%) and remuneration 
committees (88%) installed on the board. In more than 80% of all firm-years, a 
nomination committee has been created (Table T3, Panel B). Panel C shows the 
composition of the three major committees. Considering all firm-years in which a 
nomination committee is installed, the presence of executive directors is quite common. 
In more than half (53.5%) of these firm-years, we observe that at least one executive 
directors participates in the decision making of the nomination committee. The presence 
of executive directors on remuneration committee is also remarkable. Conditional on the 
presence of a remuneration committee exists, at least one executive director is member of 
the committee in one out of five firm-years. In Panel D, we examine the extent to which 
CEOs are present on the committees. Nomination committees have often been criticized 
as being not sufficiently independent from the CEO who could influence the 
appointments in order to have non-executive directors who are unlikely to oppose his 
views and not actively monitor the executive directors. In about 44% of the firm-years, 
the CEO is a member of the nomination committee which he chairs in 11.5% of the listed 
companies. CEO membership of the remuneration committee creates obvious conflicts of 
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interest, and Panel D exhibits that the CEO is a member of the remuneration committee in 
10% of the firm-years and even chairs this committee that is to set his pay in 2% of the 
cases. One would expect that these conflicts of interest are much larger in smaller firms 
which also have smaller boards. Table T4 does indeed confirm that a CEO’s committee 
membership linearly decreases with company size although CEOs are still a member of 
the remuneration committee in about 2.5% of the firm-years in FTSE 100 and in 7% for 
FTSE 250.  
 
[Insert Table T4 about here] 
 
Remuneration committees frequently hire outside advice from remuneration consultants 
(42% of all companies in 2007) and report their main consultant (Table T5). The most 
frequently hired remuneration consultant as reported by the firm in its annual report is 
New Bridge Street Consultants (hired by 15.3% of the firms at some point in time), 
followed by Towers Perrin (5.8%), and Deloitte and Touche (4.9%). Of the listed 
companies, 22.8% report that they only use internal advice to set managerial pay.   
 
The CEO compensation may also determined by company specific factors. In our 
empirical analysis, we will include corporate performance, firm size, capital structure, 
and stock price volatility as control variables. Accounting and stock performance are 
measured by the return on asset (ROA) and the market-adjusted return. The book value of 
total asset captures company size. The capital structure is measured by the long-term debt 
to total asset ratio. Stock volatility is the variance in stock price over the past 52 weeks.  
 
[Insert Table T5 about here] 
 
4.4.4 Insider and outsider ownership concentration 
 
We categorize all the share stakes held by directors and all the blocks of 3% more into 
the following shareholder categories: (i) investment and mutual funds, (ii) insurance 
companies, (iii) pension funds, (iv) banks, (v) nominees accounts, (vi) individuals and 
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families not related to a director, (vii) industrial and commercial companies, (viii) CEO, 
(ix) executive directors (excluding the CEO) and (x) non-executive directors. Categories 
(i) to (iv) constitute the institutional investors12 and classes (viii) to (x) make up the 
insider ownership. Table O1 exhibits that the ownership concentration is rather stable 
over time and fluctuates around 25%; it is 23.6% in 1998 and 25.9% in 2007. Insider 
ownership concentration, which combines the share stakes owned by the CEO, the other 
executive directors as well as the non-executive ones amounts to about 7% over the 
whole sample period. Relative to other countries (the US and Continental Europe) where 
executive directors rarely hold share stakes of more than 0.5% of the total shares 
outstanding of listed companies, executive ownership concentration in the UK is high. 
The CEO and his executive directors own on average almost 7% of the equity, which 
gives them significant voting power. The average CEO holds 2.5% of the market 
capitalization. From 1998 to 2001, an upward trend in insider ownership concentration is 
visible, possibly caused by an increase in the use of equity-based compensation for the 
top management. Subsequently, the combined insider stakes stabilize around 7%. The 
shareholder category with the highest ownership concentration is that of the investment 
funds that on average hold almost 15% of the equity. The investment fund sharing 
holdings percentage has increased gradually over the sample period from 10% in 1999 to 
17.5% in 2007. The ownership concentration held by funds offered through banks and by 
pensions funds remains relatively over time. All the institutional shareholder classes 
combined control around 22% of the voting rights. The combined equity stakes of 
industrial and commercial corporations is almost 8% over our sample period.  
 
[Insert Table O1 about here] 
 
Table O2 investigates the relation between ownership concentration and firm size. The 
ownership concentration is smallest in the FT100 firms in which the aggregated share 
blocks account for 13.4% of the market capitalization. The corresponding percentage for 
the FT250, Smallcaps and Fledgings are larger at 22.6%, 27.3% and 29.9% respectively. 
                                                 
12 The owners behind the nominees accounts are often also institutional investors (Franks, Mayer and 
Renneboog, 2001).  
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The share stakes that individual ownership and directors are able to acquire in the largest 
firms are expectedly small: insider ownership in FTSE100 averages to 1.2% and 
individuals and families not related to a director are only relatively rarely able to 
accumulate share blocks of 3% or more (the reporting threshold) such that their average 
ownership is only 0.8%. Table 4.4.12 also shows that insider ownership is already 
significantly higher (at 4.5% in FTSE250 firms) and augments with size to 8.6% in 
Fledglings. Investment funds’ average stake ranges from 8.1% in FTSE100 to 19.1% in 
Fledglings. Table O3 documents differences in ownership concentration and structure 
across sectors. The most concentrated industries are the financial, manufacturing, logistic, 
and utility industries. Least ownership concentration can found in retailing, 
communications, and leisure.  
 
[Insert Table O2, O3 about here] 
 
5. Result interpretation 
 
5.1 Compensation and director network centrality 
 
In table 6.1, we estimate the impact of social networks on the CEOs’ total annual 
compensation, which includes salary, fees, bonus, equity-based compensation and some 
miscellaneous income.  
In the first column, the degree centrality that is measured at the individual director (CEO) 
level (Degree (D)), significantly increases in the CEO’s total compensation. CEOs with a 
strong social network based on direct connections have higher compensation. When we 
replace degree by the eigen vector centrality of the network, we reach similar results.13  
 
We also investigate the relation between networks based on indirect connections, or the 
closeness level, which proxies for the information-value of the network, and 
remuneration. As shown in the third column, normalized closeness (nCloseness (D)) 
indeed significantly boosts the CEO compensation. This implies that a CEO’s network 
                                                 
13 Tables with alternative centrality measures are available upon request.  
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resources are valuable to and valued by the company. We only enter one type of 
centrality measure because some centrality measures proxy for similar types of 
connections (degree and eigenvector for direct links and closeness and betweenness for 
indirect links); still the correlations between some centrality measures such as degree and 
normalized closeness are very small (0.18). When we include both simultaneously into a 
model similar to the one in column 1 (not shown), we observe that both remain strongly 
statistically significant. So, this suggests that both our market power hypothesis 
(powerful CEOs extract higher compensation) and the information-value hypothesis 
(CEOs with networks enabling them to collect valuable information or resources) are 
both upheld. The degree coefficient’s economic significance is stronger than that of the 
closeness coefficient. When each measure moves up one standard deviation, the impact 
on total compensation is 8.8% for the former and 3.5% for the latter. This suggests that 
direct links are more important and that there is somewhat more support for the market 
power hypothesis.  
 
Now we turn to the centrality measures on the company level: a firm’s degree shows how 
many boards are interlocked with this firm. The second column shows that company 
degree (Degree (C) has a significant positive impact on the CEO’s total compensation. 
The fact that degree is high signifies that these board members are active in many other 
companies as executive or non-executive directors which may imply that these directors 
divers some of their time and energy. The probability of reciprocal collusion on each 
other’s remuneration design also increases with a higher number of board interlocks. 
When a board is more interlocked, corporate governance becomes less effective, and as a 
possible consequence, the CEO is able to extract higher compensation. In the last column, 
we evaluate the impact of company level closeness (nCloseness (C)), the collection of 
indirect links of the company through its directors.  We find a negative correlation 
which signifies that when a firm has many indirect links, it depends less on the network 
of the CEO to attract values information and resources such that the firm pays out a lower 
total compensation. This supports hypothesis H3 which states that more access to 
information improves the efficiency of remuneration design. (Below, we show more 
evidence on the pay-for-performance regressions).  
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While the centrality measures are related to total compensation, we also investigate 
whether they have a different impact on the various components of pay (Tables 6.2 –6.5). 
We first turn to the fixed salary models (Table 6.2). Our earlier results are upheld: the 
CEO’s direct network (degree (D)) yields a higher fixed salary and so does the 
company’s direct network (Degree (C)). We also find that indirect networks are also 
valued in monetary terms given the positive correlation with fixed salary. However, the 
CEO’s fixed salary does not decrease when the company’s information collection ability 
through the combined director network is high.  
 
We reach similar conclusions for our analysis of the relation between direct networks, 
and the bonus Table 6.4) and equity-based compensation (Table 6.5). The degree on the 
individual as well as company level increases for these two sub-categories of 
compensation. Also, the closeness measure for individual CEO networks increases the 
CEO’s bonus and equity-based pay. Yet, the closeness on the company level limits these 
aspects of pay. So, it seems that a well-connected company that relies less on the CEO’s 
network, pays lower bonuses and equity-based compensation. We do not find any impact 
of networks on fees (Table 6.3) and other types of compensation not included in the 
above categories. The managerial power generated by direct networks pushes up all main 
components of CEO compensation. The information-collection ability at the firm level 
reduces the performance-based compensation, bonus and equity-based pay.  
 
To sum up, a CEO’s network increases his compensation through two channels. In line 
with the managerial power hypothesis, the CEO’s direct links grant him more influence 
over the board. Potential collusion between network members may contribute to a larger 
remuneration package. We also find evidence that if the CEO has a valuable network to 
information collection, his pay increases accordingly. This is in line with our prediction 
on the information collection hypothesis: a company rewards the CEO for the resources a 
CEO can contribute to the firm through his network. When we study the director 
networks on the company level, the managerial power hypothesis and information 
collection hypotheses make different predictions. More specifically, we measure the 
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direct links from the company to all ‘adjacent’ companies and the indirect links from the 
company to all companies in the population. The former, direct centrality (degree) has 
positive correlation with CEO total compensation and its components. This result 
suggests that the direct interlocks of board members may weaken corporate governance 
efficiency and result in higher CEO compensation. The later measure, closeness at the 
firm level, lowers CEO compensation because the board is better informed and needs to 
rely less on the CEOs network. These two results jointly that it is important to have the 
‘right’ type of networks, which can provide valuable information rather than managerial 
power. 
 
Our results are not only significant in a statistical sense, but also economically. Table 6.6 
shows the economic significance of a one standard deviation change of the centrality 
measures. The degree measures on individual level and company level have relatively 
large influence (9% and 15% respectively) on the CEO’s total compensation. The 
information-collection related measures have a smaller impact. A one standard deviation 
increase of closeness (which stands for better individual information access) raises the 
total compensation by 4%. When such information advantage is realized on the company 
level, total compensation is lowered by about 4%. In short, networks that enhance 
managerial power seem more influential than information-collection networks. 
 
We move on to analyzing the pay-for-performance sensitivity, which is captured by 
performance and the interaction term between network and performance. Table 6.7 shows 
that when the number of direct connections (columns 1 (Degree D)) increases, the change 
in total compensation becomes less sensitive to the stock performance. This is in line 
with the managerial power hypothesis as we had already found a higher compensation for 
CEOs with stronger direct connections and now find that the stock performance 
sensitivity declines for this type of CEOs. We do not find any evidence for accounting 
performance sensitivity. When the degree on the company level is high (column 2 of 
Table 6.7), we also find a lower sensitivity. A higher degree at the company level 
signifies that all the directors combined have many direct links with other companies. 
This implies that the executive directors may be more powerful but also that the 
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non-executive directors exert duties in other firms which may erode their corporate 
governance effectiveness (busy board hypothesis). When we turn to the information 
collection aspect of the director networks, we note the closeness measure for the CEO 
(nCloseness (D)) has no significant impact on the pay-for-performance sensitivity of his 
remuneration. This implies that a stronger director network position for the purpose of 
information collection is not translated into a stronger pay-for-performance sensitivity. 
When we consider closeness on the company level, we observe less accounting 
performance-sensitivity, which does not support hypothesis 4.   
 
We have also included in each model a firm’s network resulting from the connections of 
their remuneration consultant through his client firms. This measure also captures a 
firm’s information gathering ability, similar to the closeness centrality discussed above. 
The firm benefits then from information on the remuneration practices of the 
remuneration consultant’s clients. The estimated network coefficient of the remuneration 
is positive and significant, implying that companies associated with remuneration with a 
large network pay their CEOs more. The interaction term of firm size and consultant 
network size is also significantly positive which signifies that larger firms employing 
larger remuneration consultants grant their CEOs a larger total compensation.  
 
5.2 Other determinants of CEO Compensation 
 
We have also controlled the above results for corporate performance, company size, CEO 
characteristics, and corporate governance variables such as share block concentration and 
board composition.   
 
In most models, both our accounting and stock price performance have a significantly 
positive impact on total compensation. In the pay-for-performance analysis, the change in 
total compensation is more sensitive to stock performance than accounting performance. 
When the changes in the components of compensation are examined (not shown), we find 
that salary is more elastic to accounting performance measure than to stock performance. 
Performance-related compensation including bonus and equity-based compensation are 
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significantly positively influenced by both accounting and stock performance. Lastly, 
fees are not related to performance. 
 
In line with all the compensation literature, company size drives up CEO compensation 
as larger companies pay more to attract and retain top managers. The debt to asset ratio is 
also positively related to the CEO compensation, which suggests that companies with 
high gearing (some of which may be financial distressed) need to attract CEOs with more 
rare skills. CEO remuneration decreases with the stock price volatility decreases CEO 
total remuneration, which is somewhat counterintuitive as we would expect the CEO to 
be better compensated in risky firms which may be more difficult to manage or demand a 
larger equity-based compensation package (which is not the case). 
 
We also investigate the impact of CEO characteristics on his or her remuneration. 
Contrary to some of the gender literature, we do not find any difference between the 
compensation of male and female CEOs, which may the result of including other control 
variables such as tenure, age, industry, corporate size. Not surprisingly, a CEO’s 
compensation increases with tenure. Combining the function of CEO with the tasks of the 
chairman does increase his salary at a first glance. However, further investigation reveals 
that the combination of both functions is almost exclusively in small companies where 
the CEO compensation is lower. When we add the interaction term between the 
combination of CEO and chairmanship and total assets, the result indicates that a CEO 
earns more if he is also the chairman, considering firm size. We also include a dummy 
variable that equals one if the CEO is a member of one of the committees (audit, 
nomination and remuneration), as such memberships his influence in the company. The 
results confirm that the committee membership yield the CEO a larger compensation. 
When we include membership of the remuneration committee, we find that conflicts of 
interest may prevail as the CEO’s total compensation augments. Lastly, the notice period 
of the CEO is not related to his pay. 
 
The board characteristics variables include the percentage of nonexecutive directors and 
the percentage of female on the board. In most model specifications, both percentages are 
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positively correlated with CEO total compensation. Contrary to Chhaochharia and 
Grinstein (2008) who work on the US, our finding suggests that non-executive directors 
in the UK are lenient in granting the CEO high compensation. This may result from the 
fact that non-executive directors are executives in other firms and raising the pay in one 
firm, may increase the compensation in their own firm.  
 
The last set of control variables consist of the ownership concentration. Among the three 
insider ownership categories, the CEO stock holdings is the only factor that significantly 
influences total compensation. Intuitively, as the CEO acquires a larger share stake in his 
company, a larger fraction of his wealth is tied to the corporate performance. Hence, he 
may need to be less incentivized through remuneration. We also find that non-executives 
owning share stakes are not more effective supervisors. As for the outsider ownership, in 
the categories of outsider block holders (classified as beyond 3%), only individual block 
holdings held by individuals or families not related to a director and the share stakes held 
through nominee accounts reduce the CEO’s compensation. Industrial block holdings are 
not related to the level of compensation but reduce changes in compensation. These 
findings provide some evidence that outsider block holders curb excessive compensation. 
However, if large share stakes are owned by institutional owners (bank, investment fund, 
pension and insurance company), the total compensation of the CEO is high. This does 
not contradict the fact that most institutional shareholders are passive monitors. A more 
detailed analysis by type of institutional owner is performed below in section on 
robustness checks. 
 
6. Further analysis and robustness checks 
 
6.1 Endogeneity 
One criticism is that there might be one common factor which contributes to both high 
compensation and strong network connections. For example, a successful CEO who is 
well compensated attracts non-executive directorships because he has a good track record 
(good past performance). Therefore, we apply an instrumental variable approach with 
board size and the CEOs honorary title as the instrumental variables for the centrality 
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measures at the individual director (CEO) level. In Table 7.1, we confirm our results that 
corroborate the managerial power hypotheses as high CEO degree measures boost total 
compensation. Similarly, on the company level, the model with instrumental variables 
generates a similar conclusion as the one implied by the random effects models: high 
degree measures on the company levels (proxying both for executive power and busy 
boards) lead to higher CEO compensation. We do not find a significant impact of the 
closeness measures which captures the information collection value of a network. We 
also run a regression with individual CEO fixed effects, but we reach the same as shown 
in Table 7.2: the relations between network centrality and compensation still persist.  
 
6.2 Heckman sample selection equation 
In most existing academic literature, the two main monitoring devices related to top 
management, namely the compensation (the carrot) and dismissal (the stick), are 
examined separately. However, Renneboog and Trojanowski (2005) point out that 
disregarding CEO turnover could cause sample selection problems. With the departing 
CEOs are not included the year of departure (when a new CEO is hired), the sample 
distribution is biased. In order to take the information of CEO turnover into account, we 
employ the Heckman sample selection equations to simultaneously study turnover (the 
selection equation) and compensation (the regression equation). Table 7.3 shows that the 
type-2 Tobit model yields virtually the same results as those resulting from the random 
effects models.  
 
6.3 Other centrality measures 
Besides the degree and closeness measures, we use additional network statistics for 
estimating the strength of networks based on direct and indirect links. In Table 7.4, we 
show the regression models with eigenvector centrality and betweenness measure as 
substitutes for degree and closeness, respectively. The details on the measurement can be 
found in the network methodology section. On the individual networks, both eigenvector 
centrality (nEigen (D)) and betweenness (nBetweenness (D)) are significantly positively 
correlated to total compensation, which is in line with our findings for degree and 
closeness. At the company level, whereas the eigenvector centrality estimates are in line 
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with those for degree, the betweenness measure yields  different results than closeness. 
Although the betweenness measure is very different from degree, the correlation in this 
sample between betweenness and degree is high, which explains its parameter estimate. 
 
6.4 Fees and the combination of the functions of CEO and chairman 
In the results above, the separation of CEO and chairman does not seem to affect salary, 
bonus or equity-based compensation. When we run a regression with total fees as the 
dependent variable, we observe that the dual position is largely compensated by means of 
fees.  
 
6.5 Sensitivity: change in performance-related compensation 
While in the previous section, we analyzed the total pay-for-performance sensitivity, we 
also examine the change in performance-related compensation (the sum of bonus and 
equity-based pay) to estimate the sensitivity. Our results are similar to those shown 
above.  
 
6.6 Institutional ownership classification 
Our models include the main categories of owner. We partition all institutional investors 
into more detailed shareholder classes in order to investigate further which types among 
the institutions are more effective in influencing CEO pay. Table 7.6 exhibits that 
pension funds are able to restrain the CEO compensation whereas the presence of blocks 
held by other classes of financial institutions does not have an effect or even a positive 
one on CEO pay. 
 
6.7 Regressions on other sample specifications 
 
New and old contracts 
Our random effect models were applied to all firm-years. With the Heckman sample 
selection models, we focused on on-going CEO contracts. The compensation-centrality 
relation for a new CEO may be different than for ongoing contracts. Compensation for 
the new CEO does not hinge on the past-performance of his new firm (but possibly on the 
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performance of his old firm). Therefore, the first year contract typically includes more 
extraordinary compensation components such as a sign-on bonus or relocation fee. These 
elements may be less relevant to the network-compensation relation. We still run our 
models on two separate samples, the new contracts and the old (on-going) contracts. For  
both the models applied to the new and the on-going contracts, we find very similar 
results as the ones shown in section 5 (except that company level closeness measure loses 
its significance for new contracts). 
 
Excluding financial companies 
The current sample includes all listed UK companies on the London Stock Exchange 
(including the ones listed on the Alternative Investment Market). We have also included 
financial companies in the network calculations as some bankers also belong to the 
director networks of industrial and commercial companies. Given that financial 
companies have a different asset organization and comply with different regulatory 
requirements than firms from other sectors, we re-estimate our results excluding financial 
firms; note that the director network measures are still calculated based on the graph 
including all companies. The result of Table 7.9 show that the non-financial sample 
yields the same results as shown above.  
   
CEO and CEO equivalents 
Some companies do not have an executive director with the title of CEO. These 
companies are usually small and led by managing directors or other senior executives. 
We did not include these ‘CEO equivalent’ managers in our main regression. As a 
robustness check, we present regression result on the sample including both the CEOs 
and the CEO equivalents. The method to selection the CEO equivalent is explained in 
appendix B. As Table 7.10 shows, the results from this larger sample is quite similar to 
the CEO sample 
 
7. Conclusion 
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In this paper, we have examined the relation between directors’ social networks, and 
CEO compensation and pay-for-performance. Specifically, we distinguish two possible 
uses of networks: the accumulation of managerial power and the collection of valuable 
information and resources. The former implies that powerful CEOs may take advantage 
of their position to extract high benefits such as compensation at a cost to the 
shareholders. The later function is beneficial to the company. The existing literature does 
not address this difference but we make this distinction by employing network centrality 
measures on the direct and indirect level. Strong direct networks, measured by degree and 
eigenvector centrality, proxy for managerial power whereas strong indirect networks, 
measured by betweenness and closeness, proxy for the information-collection value. We 
find that both strong direct and indirect networks are rewarded by a higher compensation 
(fixed salary, bonus, and equity-based compensation). When we look further into 
pay-for-performance sensitivity of the CEO compensation, we find that strong direct 
networks decrease pay-for-performance sensitivity. High CEO compensation and low 
pay-for-performance corroborates the managerial power hypothesis. While the 
information value of indirect networks is reflected in higher CEO compensation, this type 
of networks does not influence the pay-for-performance relation.  
 
When we study the director networks on the company level, the managerial power 
hypothesis and information collection hypotheses make different predictions. More 
specifically, we measure the direct links from the company to all ‘adjacent’ companies 
and the indirect links from the company to all companies in the population. We find that 
strong direct company networks leads to higher compensation (in all its components) and 
lower pay-for-performance sensitivity. This finding is in line with the managerial power 
hypothesis but also with the busy board hypothesis as directors who exert duties as 
executive or non-executive director may be less effective monitors as reflected in high 
CEO compensation with low pay-for-performance sensitivity. Closeness at the firm level, 
lowers CEO compensation because the board is better informed and needs to rely less on 
the CEOs network. These two results jointly that it is important to have the ‘right’ type of 
networks, which can provide valuable information rather than managerial power. 
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We have controlled the centrality-CEO compensation relation for many CEO, board and 
company characteristics. For instance, we confirm that there are conflicts of interest when 
a CEO is a member of the remuneration committee because his compensation is then 
significantly higher. The size of the remuneration consultant network increases CEO 
compensation, especially in large firms. The proportion of non-executive directors and 
female directors increase CEO total compensation 
 
A set of robustness tests including an instrumental variable approach, sample selection 
method, fixed effects regressions, specifications with alternative variables confirm the 
main results.  
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Figure 1. Example of a CEO’s professional network  
This Figure depicts the director networks surrounding Andy Hornby (white circle in the middle of the 
graph). Directors in the four companies served by Andy Hornby are represented as circles in different 
colors. In this figure, each circle stands for a vertex (director) in the network. Directors sitting on the same 
board established links between them. The lines between circles are the links between vertices (directors). 
The size of a circle represents the number of links it has. Data source: Own calculations based on Manifest. 
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Figure N2. A Director Network Graph 
This figure is a hypothetical director network graph used for centrality illustration. 
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Figure N3a. The network of the financial sector 
This is the company networks in the finance industry in the UK market, 2007. Each box stands for a 
financial company. Data source: Own calculations based on Manifest. 
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Figure N3b. The network of the IT sector 
This is the company networks in the IT industry in the UK market, 2007. Each box stands for a company. 
Data source: Own calculations based on Manifest. 
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Table N1. An example of director network  
These tables explain how director networks are mathematically recorded and calculated. Panel A is an 
overview on the example network. Panel B is the matrix used to record the network. Panel C calculated the 
geodesic distance between each pair of directors. Panel D shows the basic centrality measures calculated 
for this example network. 
 
Panel A : Example of a network 
 
Company Director  Company Director 
1 a  5 a 
   5 b 
2 b  5 j 
2 c  5 f 
   5 d 
3 a    
3 e  6 b 
3 f  6 g 
   6 d 
4 h  6 e 
4 d  6 h 
4 i  6 i 
4 j    
 
Panel B : Matrix representation of above table.  
 
  a b c d e f g h i j 
a 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 
b 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
c 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
d 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
e 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 
f 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 
g 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 
h 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 
i 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
j 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 
Panel C : Geodesic distances 
 
 a b c d e f g h i j 
a 0 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 
b 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
c 2 1 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
d 1 1 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
e 1 1 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 2 
f 1 1 2 1 1 0 1 2 1 1 
g 2 1 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 
h 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 0 1 1 
i 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
j 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 0 
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Panel D : Centrality measures 
 
 
Degree Betweenness Closeness 
Harmonic 
closeness 
Eigen 
centrality 
a       6      0.167    12.000 1.200      0.299 
b       9      8.933     9.000 1.000      0.379 
c       1      0.000    17.000 1.800      0.054 
d       8      0.933    10.000 1.059      0.372 
e       7      0.567    11.000 1.125      0.336 
f       7      0.567    11.000 1.125      0.336 
g       6      0.167    12.000 1.200      0.299 
h       6      0.367    12.000 1.200      0.293 
i       8      0.933   10.000 1.059      0.372 
j       6      0.367   12.000 1.200      0.293 
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Table R1. CEO remuneration 
This table shows CEO total remuneration and its components for the whole sample and over the period 1996 to 2007. N is the 
number of observations (firm-years). Mean stands for the average value; SD is the standard deviation. P25 and P75 are the value 
at the first and third quartile, respectively. Percent captures the percentage of the total remuneration that is awarded via this type 
of remuneration. The values in bold are unconditional statistics, which takes into account all variables with a zero value. The 
other values are conditional statistics based on non-zero values only. N (the number of observations) always equals to maximum 
number of observations possible for the unconditional statistics. The N for the conditional statistics is the number of firm years 
when a certain type of remuneration is actually given. Data source: Own calculations based on Manifest and Datastream. 
 
Variable N Mean SD Min P25 Median P75 Max Percent 
Total salary 13,854  202,931  203,891  0  0  166,000  296,600  2,400,000  30.70% 
Salary in cash 3,392  302,738  220,312  1,846  151,086  249,500  395,000  2,248,685   
Salary in shares 8  21,412  27,830  2,993  2,999  5,000  41,374  69,554   
Total fees 13,854  4,032  45,895  0  0  0  0  4,939,000  0.61% 
Fees in cash 685  32,777  50,598  448  19,000  23,000  29,412  1,000,000   
Fees in shares 1  755,555  . 755,555  755,555  755,555  755,555  755,555   
Total bonus 13,854  126,290  357,054  0  0  9,000  120,764  10,000,000  19.11% 
Bonus in cash 7,006  221,039  401,899  130  50,000  112,500  241,000  10,000,000   
Bonus in shares 71  259,067  475,088  2,658  60,000  121,874  254,363  3,116,035   
Bonus vol deferred 74  284,467  299,701  6,445  81,975  166,500  420,000  1,312,500   
Bonus mand deferred 383  351,810  471,916  2,296  90,000  185,853  426,770  3,837,500   
Total equity 13,854  296,215  2,507,032  0  0  0  112,998  186,841,117  44.81% 
Restricted shares 2,724  873,798  3,311,575  2  144,230  335,248  735,428  134,000,000   
Stock options 2,504  724,886  6,170,366  0  85,577  202,765  424,812  186,841,117  
Total miscellaneous 13,854  6,678  100,691  0  0  0  0  6,333,880  1.01% 
Transaction Bonus 24  730,499  1,090,632  25,014  88,604  158,125  1,067,548  4,686,697   
Deferred Cash Bonus 74  315,155  763,065  573  66,973  138,000  299,623  6,333,880   
Loss of Office  88  372,080  327,852  20,775  156,500  267,550  442,500  1,544,745   
Recruitment incentive 29  535,351  800,968  4,556  87,500  221,799  539,000  3,225,044   
Reallocation expenses 28  121,207  134,532  5,000  38,146  72,000  130,055  500,000   
Other 13,854  24,867  102,144  0  0  10,000  20,000  6,624,000  3.76% 
Overall Total 13,854  661,012  2,652,929  0  39,375  253,684  622,868  186,879,117  100% 
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Figure R1. CEO remuneration structure over the whole sample from 1996-2007 
This pie chart shows the proportions of different components of CEO remuneration. 
 
CEO's remuneration structure
salarytotal feestotal bonustotal equitytotal misctotal others
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Table R2. CEO remuneration structure over time 
This table shows the CEO remuneration structure over time. Panel A shows the average CEO compensation over time, the percentages are the proportion of this 
compensation component as part of total compensation. Panel B contains inflation-adjusted remuneration values, with 2007 as the base year. Panel C shows the 
CEO median compensation over time. N is the number of observations in each year. Equity-based compensation includes restricted shares and stock options. 
Miscellaneous covers transaction bonus, deferred bonus, loss f office, recruitment incentive and reallocation expenses. Except for Panel C, all the values are 
unconditional on whether that type of remuneration is granted. If a type of compensation is not granted to the CEO in a firm-year, a zero will be recorded as its 
value. Data source: Manifest, Datastream, UK National Statistics Online (CPI data). 
 
Panel A 
 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007  Total 
N 749  832  915  984  1,065  1,133  1,117  1,151  1,400  1,449  1,528  1,531   13,854  
Salary 181,009  190,203  192,741  194,401  204,652  209,295  210,977  217,923  203,087  205,214  200,275  209,441   202,931  
 44.59% 49.54% 48.80% 48.42% 28.18% 33.44% 32.78% 28.72% 26.62% 27.63% 25.55% 23.56%  34.82% 
Fee 2,343  2,357  2,243  7,670  3,114  2,885  3,428  3,862  3,891  3,741  4,404  6,584   4,032  
 0.58% 0.61% 0.57% 1.91% 0.43% 0.46% 0.53% 0.51% 0.51% 0.50% 0.56% 0.74%  0.66% 
Bonus 68,493  72,037  71,636  86,503  104,508  81,872  101,129  124,207  131,794  163,452  194,364  202,084   126,290  
 16.87% 18.76% 18.14% 21.54% 14.39% 13.08% 15.71% 16.37% 17.28% 22.01% 24.79% 22.74%  18.47% 
Equity-based 131,144  96,742  96,935  83,871  385,216  302,648  286,757  380,858  388,319  338,883  352,450  436,809   296,215  
 32.30% 25.20% 24.54% 20.89% 53.04% 48.36% 44.55% 50.19% 50.91% 45.63% 44.96% 49.15%  40.81% 
Miscellaneous 521  292  245  1,833  1,764  823  14,659  5,012  11,010  9,493  9,772  13,586   6,678  
 0.13% 0.08% 0.06% 0.46% 0.24% 0.13% 2.28% 0.66% 1.44% 1.28% 1.25% 1.53%  0.79% 
Other 22,454  22,316  31,146  27,231  27,027  28,311  26,761  27,030  24,679  21,906  22,662  20,282   24,867  
 5.53% 5.81% 7.89% 6.78% 3.72% 4.52% 4.16% 3.56% 3.24% 2.95% 2.89% 2.28%  4.44% 
Overall Total 405,962  383,947  394,946  401,510  726,281  625,833  643,711  758,891  762,779  742,689  783,927  888,786   661,012  
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Panel B. Inflation adjusted 
 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007  All 
N 749 832 915 984 1,065 1,133 1,117 1,151 1,400 1,449 1,528 1,531   13,854 
CPI Index 84.1  85.7  87.0  88.2  88.9  90.0  91.1  92.4  93.6  95.5  97.7  100.0     
Salary 215,115 222,010 221,515 220,518 230,151 232,624 231,544 235,952 216,972 214,859 204,974 209,441   221,306 
Fees 2,784 2,751 2,578 8,700 3,502 3,207 3,762 4,182 4,157 3,917 4,507 6,584   4,219 
Bonus 81,399 84,083 82,330 98,124 117,529 90,998 110,987 134,483 140,804 171,134 198,924 202,084   126,073 
Equity-based 155,854 112,920 111,406 95,139 433,213 336,383 314,711 412,366 414,867 354,811 360,719 436,809   294,933 
Miscellaneous 619 341 282 2,079 1,984 915 16,088 5,427 11,763 9,939 10,001 13,586   6,085 
Other 26,685 26,048 35,796 30,889 30,394 31,467 29,370 29,266 26,366 22,936 23,194 20,282   27,724 
Overall Total 482,454 448,152 453,906 455,451 816,774 695,591 706,463 821,674 814,928 777,595 802,318 888,786   680,341 
 
Panel C 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007  Total 
N 749  832  915  984  1,065  1,133  1,117  1,151  1,400  1,449  1,528  1,531   13,854  
Salary 154,000  159,000  168,000  168,937  175,000  176,000  180,000  186,000  163,000  156,905  151,625  151,086   166,000  
Fees 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0   0  
Bonus 21,926  25,000  22,361  25,000  13,000  0  0  20,000  4,500  0  0  0   9,000  
Equity-based 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0   0  
Miscellaneous 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0   0  
Other 10,000  11,000  11,000  12,000  12,038  12,000  12,000  12,000  8,000  3,664  2,020  1,000   10,000  
Overall Total 214,100  226,382  237,720  236,000  263,000  267,418  273,000  309,540  270,915  259,170  241,288  228,727   251,303  
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Figure R2a. CEO Remuneration over the whole sample from 1996-2007 
This figures shows the change in the value and structure of CEO compensation over the whole sample period. 
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Figure R4b. Real (Inflation adjusted) and Nominal CEO remuneration over the whole sample from 1996-2007 
This figure shows the CEO compensation trend over time, in inflation adjusted value and nominal value. 
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Table R4. The best paid CEOs by industry in 2007 
This table shows the five highest paid CEOs by sector in 2007. Tenure is the number of years he/she has served as CEO. When turnover equals 1, the CEO will not leave his position in the 
subsequent year. When CEO=chair equals 1, the CEO is also the chairman of the board. Data source: Own calculations based on Manifest and Datastream. 
 
CHEMICAL               
Company First_name Surname Gender Age Tenure Turn over Chairman Salary total Fees total Bonus Equity-based Misc. Others Total 
GlaxoSmithKline plc Jean-Pierre Garnier Male 60 8 1 0 911,554  0  1,364,309  13,700,000  0  763,490  16,700,000  
Shire plc (OLD) Matthew Emmens Male 56 5 0 0 582,186  0  1,049,546  5,357,139  0  212,025  7,200,896  
AstraZeneca plc David R Brennan Male 54 2 1 0 999,184  0  1,015,300  4,943,462  0  151,086  7,109,033  
Phytopharm plc Daryl Rees Male 47 1 1 0 181,401  0  77,000  2,014,572  0  16,778  2,289,751  
Johnson Matthey plc Neil Carson  Male 51 4 1 0 630,000  0  573,000  959,999  0  29,000  2,191,999  
Average        660,865  0  815,831  5,395,034  0  234,476  7,098,336  
COMMUNICATIONS 
  
            
Vodafone Group plc Arun Sarin Male 53 5 1 0 1,310,000  0  2,130,000  6,108,709  0  155,000  9,703,709  
BT Group plc Ben Verwaayen Male 56 6 0 0 792,000  0  2,301,000  2,966,123  0  53,000  6,112,123  
Freedom4 Communications plc Micheal Read Male 60 4 1 0 384,000  0  1,800,000  563,775  0  0  2,747,775  
Inmarsat plc Andrew Sukawaty Male 52 4 1 1 376,709  0  400,882  496,539  0  18,130  1,292,261  
Thus Group plc William Allan Male 54 9 1 0 435,120  0  209,075  602,140  0  21,147  1,267,482  
Average        659,566  0  1,368,191  2,147,457  0  49,455  4,224,670  
FINANCIAL 
  
            
Man Group plc Peter Clarke Male 48 0 1 0 462,000  0  6,724,000  5,675,855  0  11,000  12,900,000  
ICAP plc Michael Spencer Male 53 9 1 0 360,000  0  7,675,000  2,838,647  0  5,817  10,900,000  
F&C Asset Management plc Alain Grisay Male 54 2 1 0 325,000  0  1,794,333  7,334,000  0  11,000  9,464,333  
HSBC Holdings plc Michael Geoghegan Male 54 2 1 0 1,040,000  0  1,915,000  5,013,237  0  61,000  8,029,237  
Royal Bank of Scotland Frederick  Goodwin Male 49 8 1 0 1,290,000  0  2,860,000  3,717,474  0  40,000  7,907,474  
Average        695,400  0  4,193,667  4,915,843  0  25,763  9,840,209  
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FOOD               
Company First_name Surname Gender Age Tenure Turn over Chairman Salary total Fees total Bonus Equity-based Misc. Others Total 
Tesco plc Terence Leahy Male 52 
11 1 0 1,293,000  0  2,879,000  16,400,000  0  95,000  20,600,000  
Diageo plc Paul Walsh Male 53 
8 1 0 1,087,000  0  1,188,000  6,166,799  0  39,000  8,480,799  
J Sainsbury plc Justin King Male 47 
4 1 0 850,000  0  1,563,000  4,552,890  0  29,000  6,994,890  
SABMiller plc Ernest Mackay Male 59 
9 1 0 1,020,000  0  1,606,000  3,943,875  0  310,055  6,879,930  
British American Tobacco plc Paul Adams  Male 55 
4 1 0 1,076,641  0  1,015,616  3,245,902  0  137,016  5,475,175  
Average     
   1,065,328  0  1,650,323  6,861,893  0  122,014  9,686,159  
IT 
    
          
Invensys plc Ulf Henriksson Male 45 
3 1 0 750,000  0  1,024,500  7,497,647  0  15,857  9,288,004  
Misys plc John Lawrie Male 55 
2 1 0 570,000  0  1,026,000  2,097,433  0  31,681  3,725,114  
Sage Group plc; The Paul Walker  Male 50 
21 1 0 699,000  0  793,000  1,075,362  0  21,000  2,588,362  
Logica plc Martin Peter Read Male 58 
14 0 0 503,000  0  0  1,505,673  0  29,000  2,037,673  
Innovation Group plc; The Hassan Sadiq Male 40 
5 1 0 285,000  0  200,000  1,485,000  0  48,000  2,018,000  
Average     
   561,400  0  608,700  2,732,223  0  29,108  3,931,431  
LEISURE 
    
          
Sportech plc Ian Penrose Male 42 
2 1 0 281,000  0  420,000  4,350,000  0  16,000  5,067,000  
Partygaming plc Mitchell Garber Male 43 
2 1 0 528,802  0  396,832  530,700  3,225,044  90,480  4,771,858  
InterContinental Hotels Group plc Andrew Cosslett Male 53 
3 1 0 732,000  0  1,114,560  2,776,197  0  25,000  4,647,757  
Domino's Pizza UK & Ireland plc Stephen Hemsley Male 50 
7 0 0 240,000  0  240,000  3,360,000  0  35,000  3,875,000  
Thomas Cook Group plc Manny Fontenla-Novoa Male 54 
1 1 0 231,000  0  2,652,000  842,839  0  5,000  3,730,839  
Average     
   402,560  0  964,678  2,371,947  645,009  34,296  4,418,491  
LOGISTICS 
    
          
Galiform plc Matthew Ingle Male 53 
2 1 0 525,000  0  525,000  5,656,541  0  18,000  6,724,541  
Clarkson plc Richard Fulford-Smith Male 53 
4 1 0 550,000  0  2,500,000  808,220  0  90,000  3,948,220  
Bunzl plc Michael Roney Male 54 
2 1 0 725,000  0  556,000  2,076,675  0  28,900  3,386,575  
Michael Page International plc Stephen Ingham Male 45 
2 1 0 360,000  0  1,533,000  1,277,626  0  22,000  3,192,626  
Experian plc Don Robert Male 49 
2 1 0 704,977  0  704,977  1,138,076  0  473,845  3,021,876  
Average     
   572,995  0  1,163,795  2,191,428  0  126,549  4,054,768  
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MEDIA               
Company First_name Surname Gender Age Tenure Turn over Chairman Salary total Fees total Bonus Equity-based Misc. Others Total 
WPP Group plc Martin Sorrell Male 63 
22 0 0 1,003,000  0  1,650,000  5,448,569  0  35,000  8,136,569  
Pearson plc Marjorie Scardino Female 61 
11 1 0 900,000  0  1,341,000  3,810,123  0  91,000  6,142,123  
British Sky Broadcasting Group plc Jeremy Darroch Male 47 
1 1 0 675,029  0  1,216,250  3,629,200  0  17,132  5,537,611  
Yell Group plc John Condron Male 58 
7 1 0 850,000  0  1,206,150  2,356,120  0  311,000  4,723,270  
Reed Elsevier plc Crispin Davis  Male 59 
8 1 0 1,135,680  0  1,267,419  2,076,728  0  28,137  4,507,964  
Average     
   912,742  0  1,336,164  3,464,148  0  96,454  5,809,507  
MINING & MANUFACTURING 
    
          
BHP Billiton plc Marius Kloppers Male 47 
1 1 0 842,571  0  907,285  15,200,000  0  37,323  17,000,000  
Ferrexpo plc Michael Oppenheimer Male 54 
2 1 0 286,057  0  0  2,280,342  4,686,698  0  7,253,096  
Rexam plc Leslie Van De Walle Male 52 
1 1 0 750,000  0  360,000  4,217,837  1,469,482  81,000  6,878,319  
Tomkins plc James Nicol Male 54 
6 1 0 879,000  0  1,142,000  3,614,166  0  45,000  5,680,166  
Gem Diamonds Ltd Clifford Elphick Male 47 
0 1 0 356,383  0  231,649  5,052,310  0  24,060  5,664,402  
Average     
   622,802  0  528,187  6,072,931  1,231,236  37,477  8,495,197  
OTHER (E.g., Health care equipment ) 
    
          
Reckitt Benckiser Group plc Bart Becht Male 51 
8 1 0 912,000  0  3,257,000  26,700,000  0  112,000  31,000,000  
Burberry Group plc Angela Ahrendts Female 48 
2 1 0 850,000  0  1,147,500  8,863,719  1,760,934  420,000  13,000,000  
Eurasian Natural Resources Corp plc Johannes Sittard Male 65 
1 1 0 1,623,000  0  1,000,000  9,990,000  0  53,000  12,700,000  
Shire plc Matthew Emmens Male 56 
5 0 0 582,186  0  1,049,546  5,354,655  0  212,025  7,198,412  
Cadbury Schweppes plc H Stitzer Male 56 
5 1 0 862,000  0  1,715,000  2,060,791  0  666,000  5,303,791  
Average     
   965,837  0  1,633,809  10,593,833  352,187  292,605  13,840,441  
RETAILING 
    
          
Marks & Spencer Group plc Stuart Rose Male 59 
4 1 0 1,070,000  0  0  5,774,992  0  305,000  7,149,992  
DSG International plc John Browett Male 44 
0 1 0 275,000  0  0  2,834,111  600,000  7,000  3,716,111  
HMV Group plc Simon Fox Male 47 
2 1 0 493,000  0  498,000  2,376,596  0  1,000  3,368,596  
Signet Group plc Terry Lee Burman Male 62 
8 1 0 792,014  0  0  2,048,197  0  55,375  2,895,586  
Kingfisher plc Gerard Murphy Male 52 
5 0 0 925,700  0  326,000  1,380,138  0  57,468  2,689,306  
Average     
   711,143  0  164,800  2,882,807  120,000  85,169  3,963,918  
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UTILITIES               
Company First_name Surname Gender Age Tenure Turn over Chairman Salary total Fees total Bonus Equity-based Misc. Others Total 
Royal Dutch Shell plc Jeroen van der Veer Male 60 
10 0 0 1,305,176  0  2,122,106  14,300,000  0  23,463  17,700,000  
BG Group plc Frank Chapman Male 55 
7 1 0 996,593  0  1,400,000  6,266,753  0  4,161  8,667,507  
Dana Petroleum plc Thomas Cross Male 47 
13 1 0 588,000  0  1,764,000  4,527,650  0  65,000  6,944,650  
BP plc Anthony Hayward  Male 51 
1 1 0 877,000  0  1,262,000  3,616,312  0  14,000  5,769,312  
Centrica plc William Laidlaw Male 52 
2 1 0 873,000  0  753,000  2,865,444  0  64,000  4,555,444  
Average     
   927,954  0  1,460,221  6,315,232  0  34,125  8,727,383  
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Table R5 CEO total remuneration by size (index). 
This table shows the CEOs’ total remuneration by index membership over time. The data is nominal. Data source: Own calculations based on Manifest. 
 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007  Average Annual Increase 
FTSE 100 955,869  1,038,242  1,120,791  1,299,045  1,514,746  2,028,255  2,311,766  2,679,007  3,286,194  3,242,778  3,670,274  4,437,831   2,334,128  15.30% 
FTSE 250 415,895  504,910  496,427  482,648  1,191,443  750,820  1,009,197  1,115,332  1,560,428  1,295,518  1,412,776  1,551,190   998,383  19.41% 
FTSE SmallCap 369,810  228,203  246,511  246,755  781,335  476,123  421,753  641,486  404,161  505,388  612,414  708,272   483,963  19.36% 
FTSE Fledgling 125,901  133,963  137,530  165,358  241,735  318,374  210,233  208,834  231,710  332,479  295,162  273,020   234,954  9.84% 
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Figure R5. CEO remuneration across indices over the whole sample from 1996-2007 
This figure compares the average total CEO compensation of firms listed in different indices. 
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Table T1. CEO characteristics: tenure, age, gender, and board duality 
These panels summarize the individual characteristics of the CEOs. Panels A-D present the data on gender, 
age, tenure (in years), and board duality (are the functions of CEO and chairman of the board exerted by 
two different persons or by the CEO alone). N stands for the number of firm-years. The mean is the average 
value of the variable; SD stands for standard deviation. P25 and P75 are the values at the 25% and 75% 
quartiles, respectively. The exceptionally old CEO of 97 years is Gerald Ashfield who joined London and 
St Lawrence Investment Company plc in 1952. Data source: Own calculations based on Manifest. 
 
Panel A. Male  N Mean SD Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
CEO 13,289  0.981  0.137  0 1 1 1 1 
Executive dirs. (excl CEO) 35,463  0.961  0.194  0 1 1 1 1 
Non-executive dirs. 62,622  0.946  0.226  0 1 1 1 1 
Panel B. Age         
CEO 13,289  53  8  26  47  53  58  97  
Executive dirs. (excl CEO) 35,463  50  8  25  44  50  55  86  
Non-executive dirs. 62,622  58  8  23  54  59  64  91  
Panel C. Tenure         
CEO 13,289  6  7  0  1  4  8  51  
Executive dirs. (excl CEO) 35,463  7  6  0  3  5  9  90  
Non-executive dirs. 62,622  7  6  0  3  6  9  95  
 
Figure T1. CEO turnover and tenure over the whole sample from 1996-2007 
This figure depicts the trends in turnover, disciplinary turnover and tenure for CEOs over the whole sample 
period. The diamond curve and square curve stands for the turnover and disciplinary turnover trends, using 
vertical axis on the left. The circle curve shows the average CEO tenure over sample period, using vertical 
axis on the right. 
 
CEO turnover and tenure over time
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
disciplinary turnover turnover tenure
 
 
 70 
Table T2 CEO turnover and contract notice period 
Panel A presents basic statistics concerning CEO turnover. Panel B also shows the notice period of CEO 
contracts. The frequency/percentage columns gives how often a specific notification period is included in a 
CEO employment contract. Data source: Own calculations based on Manifest. 
 
Panel A. Turnover, disciplinary turnover and deceased 
 
Turnover Frequency Percentage 
0 3290 23.75% 
1 10564 76.25% 
   
Deceased Frequency Percentage 
1 152 1.1% 
0 13,702 98.9% 
   
Disciplinary turnover Frequency Percentage 
0 1,438 10.38% 
1 12,416 89.62% 
 
Panel B. Notice period 
Notice period (months) Frequency Percentage 
 0 27 0.27% 
1 34 0.34% 
2 12 0.12% 
3 120 1.19% 
4-6 801 7.93% 
9 11 0.11% 
11-12 7,775 76.96% 
15 1 0.01% 
16-18 83 0.82% 
20-24 1,123 11.12% 
36 106 1.05% 
48 5 0.05% 
60 5 0.05% 
Total 13854 100% 
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Table T3. Board structure and board committees 
This table gives an overview of the board composition and structure and of the board’s committees. In Panel A, N is the 
number of observations. The mean is the average value of the variable; SD stands for standard deviation. P25 and P75 
are the values at the 25% and 75% quartiles, respectively. Board size refers to the number of directors on the board. 
Percentage of executives is calculated as number of executives divided by board size. The number of males is the 
number of male directors on the board. Similarly, the Percentage of males is the number of males divided by the board 
size. The bottom row of Panel A shows the probability of having the CEO as chairman of the board. Panel B shows the 
frequency of occurrence of the three main board committees in UK listed firms. The denominator is the number of firm 
years: 13845). Panel C gives details on the staffing of the committees. The first row reports the size of the committee. The 
second row shows the proportion of committees with at least one executive presence in all firm years. The last row 
shows the average proportion of executives in the committee. Panel D shows the CEO’s presence in the committees. Data 
source: Own calculations based on Manifest 
 
Panel A 
 Mean SD Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
Board size 7.89  3.41 1 6 7 10 26 
Number of executive dirs. 3.35  2.26  0 2 3 5 18 
Percentage of executive dirs 41%  15.0%  0% 25.0%  35.3%  45.5%  100% 
Percentage of male dirs. 96%  8% 0% 92.0%  100% 100% 100% 
CEO-Chairman duality 13.1 33.8% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
Panel B 
 
Presence of Committee in listed firms  
(13854 firm-years) 
Audit Committee Nomination Committee Remuneration Committee 
Present 98.0% 80.1% 87.7% 
Absent 0.5% 18.4% 10.8% 
Unknown 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 
       
Panel C. Composition of Committee Audit Committee Nomination Committee Remuneration Committee 
Average committee size 3.81 4.30 3.80 
Executive presence in the committee  17.7% 53.5% 20.2% 
Proportion of executives in the committee 2.1% 14.7% 2.3% 
       
Panel D. CEO presence in committees  Audit Committee Nomination Committee Remuneration Committee 
No 80.7% 54.6% 88.8% 
Yes as a Member 13.9% 32.5% 7.8% 
Yes as the Chairman 3.9% 11.4% 1.9% 
Unknown 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 
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Table T4. CEO presence in committee by index. 
This table provides information about CEO’s presence (as member or chairman) in a committee for 
companies belonging to different indices. Data source: Own calculations based on Manifest. 
 
 Audit Committee 
FTSE Index 
FTSE 100  
 1276 firm-years 
FTSE 250 
 3386 firm-years 
FTSE Small Cap 
 4662 firm-years 
FTSE Fledgling 
 2705 firm-years 
No member  98.0% 87.9% 77.1% 69.2% 
Member 1.8% 10.0% 17.8% 21.5% 
Chairman 0.2% 2.0% 4.7% 8.1% 
Unknown 0% 0.1% 0.4% 1.2% 
  Nomination Committee 
No member 46.5% 44.3% 47.2% 60.2% 
Member 47.0% 43.4% 37.9% 23.4% 
Chairman 6.5% 12.2% 14.5% 15.2% 
Unknown 0% 0.1% 0.4% 1.2% 
  Remuneration Committee 
No member 97.3% 92.8% 90.3% 82.7% 
Member 2.2% 6.3% 7.6% 11.6% 
Chairman 0.5% 0.8% 1.7% 4.6% 
Unknown 0% 0.1% 0.4% 1.2% 
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Table T5. Remuneration advisors  
This table shows the top 10 remuneration advisors in UK listed companies. Frequency indicates the number 
of companies that advisor has been employed to advise in a certain field. For instance, Towers Perrin has 
been hired by 142 companies during the sample period 1996-2007. ‘Internal advice’ signifies that the 
company explicitly mentions not to have hired an external advisor but to rely on internsl advice only. Data 
source: Own calculations based on Manifest. 
 
Top 10 Remuneration advisor Frequency Percentage 
New Bridge Street Consultants  376 15.3% 
Towers Perrin 142 5.8% 
Deloitte & Touche  121 4.9% 
Watson Wyatt  117 4.8% 
Monks Partnership 97 3.9% 
Mercer Human Resource Consulting 86 3.5% 
PricewaterhouseCoopers  58 2.4% 
KPMG  56 2.3% 
Kepler Associates  47 1.9% 
Hewitt Bacon & Woodrow 41 1.7% 
Internal Advice 561 22.8% 
Total (excluding Internal Advice) 1141 46.3% 
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Table O1. Ownership concentration over time of all listed companies 
This table shows how ownership concentration has developed over time. The numbers are based on all disclosed ownership 
stakes of 3% or more for all shareholder categories apart from the directors of whom all shareholdings are reported and 
included in this table. The share stake concentration of the executive directors includes that of the CEO. The table also shows 
share percentages owned by institutions, including banks, insurance companies, investment funds, pension funds, and of 
other outsiders such as corporations and individuals and families not related to a director. Data source: Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
 
 % 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007  total 
N 760 807 939 1078 1063 1103 1344 1386 1409 1398  11412 
CEO  1.3% 2.4% 2.8% 3.1% 2.6% 2.6% 2.2% 2.7% 2.6% 2.2%  2.5% 
Executive directors (incl. CEO)  2.6% 4.9% 5.5% 6.0% 4.8% 4.8% 4.1% 4.5% 4.9% 4.4%  4.7% 
Non-executive directors  0.9% 1.8% 2.1% 2.8% 2.2% 2.2% 2.1% 2.2% 2.4% 2.4%   2.1% 
Inside total 3.6% 6.7% 7.5% 8.8% 7.0% 7.0% 6.2% 6.6% 7.3% 6.8%   6.8% 
Nominee accounts 0.7% 1.0% 1.1% 1.2% 1.1% 1.1% 1.3% 2.1% 2.2% 2.2%  1.5% 
Institutions total 18.2% 19.1% 20.2% 21.6% 22.3% 22.7% 18.0% 20.9% 21.1% 22.3%  20.7% 
Bank funds 2.9% 2.0% 1.4% 1.2% 1.5% 1.5% 1.6% 1.7% 1.8% 1.9%  1.7% 
Insurance companies’ funds 6.5% 6.6% 6.2% 4.4% 3.7% 3.6% 2.5% 2.5% 2.4% 2.4%  3.8% 
Investment and mutual funds 8.5% 10.1% 12.1% 15.4% 16.4% 16.9% 13.3% 16.1% 16.4% 17.5%  14.7% 
Pension funds 0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 0.7% 0.7% 0.8% 0.6% 0.6% 0.5% 0.5%  0.6% 
Individuals and families 5.2% 1.6% 1.6% 1.8% 2.0% 1.8% 1.5% 1.6% 1.4% 1.3%  1.9% 
Corporations 9.9% 9.0% 7.6% 6.9% 7.2% 7.1% 6.0% 7.6% 7.9% 9.3%   7.8% 
Outside total 34.0% 30.7% 30.5% 31.4% 32.5% 32.7% 26.8% 32.0% 32.7% 35.1%   31.8% 
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Table O2. Ownership concentration across indices 
This table presents the ownership difference for firms belonging to indices (FTSE100, FTSE250, FTSE 
Small Cap, and FTSE Fledgling). The numbers are based on all disclosed ownership stakes of 3% or more 
for all shareholder categories apart from the directors of whom all shareholdings are reported and included 
in this table. The share stake concentration of the executive directors includes that of the CEO. The table 
also shows share percentages owned by institutions, including banks, insurance companies, investment 
funds, pension funds, and of other outsiders such as corporations and individuals and families not related to 
a director. Data source: Own calculations based on Manifest. 
 
 FTSE 100 FTSE 250 FTSE Small Cap FTSE Fledgling 
N 1049  2833  3967  2315  
CEO  0.3% 1.5% 2.5% 3.2% 
Executive directors (incl. CEO)  1.1% 3.1% 4.7% 5.7% 
Non-executive directors  0.2% 1.5% 2.0% 3.1% 
Inside total 1.3% 4.6% 6.7% 8.7% 
Nominee accounts 0.8% 0.6% 1.2% 1.5% 
Institutions total 12.2% 21.2% 24.7% 25.3% 
Bank funds 1.8% 2.1% 1.8% 1.6% 
Insurance companies’ funds 2.3% 5.2% 5.2% 3.5% 
Investment and mutual funds 8.0% 13.5% 16.9% 19.1% 
Pension funds 0.1% 0.3% 0.7% 1.1% 
Individuals and families 0.8% 1.1% 1.9% 3.2% 
Corporations 5.9% 6.9% 8.2% 9.3% 
Outside total 19.7% 29.8% 35.9% 39.2% 
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Table O3. Ownership concentration by sector 
This table shows company ownership structure in different sectors according to the broad sector classification shown above. The 
numbers are based on all disclosed ownership stakes of 3% or more for all shareholder categories apart from the directors of whom all 
shareholdings are reported and included in this table. The share stake concentration of the executive directors includes that of the 
CEO. The table also shows share percentages owned by institutions, including banks, insurance companies, investment funds, pension 
funds, and of other outsiders such as corporations and individuals and families not related to a director. Data source: Own calculations 
based on Manifest. 
 
(All in 
percentage) 
Chemical 
Communi
cation 
Financial Food IT Leisure Logistics Media 
Mining& 
Manufac
ture 
Other Retailer Utility 
CEO  1.9% 5.2% 3.1% 1.2% 4.3% 2.1% 2.9% 2.7% 1.7% 1.2% 5.2% 1.7% 
Exec  4.1% 6.2% 5.7% 2.8% 8.0% 4.2% 4.8% 7.7% 3.4% 2.1% 9.7% 3.7% 
Nonexec  2.1% 1.0% 2.1% 1.8% 3.2% 3.0% 2.5% 2.1% 1.8% 1.4% 3.2% 2.3% 
Inside total 6.2% 7.2% 7.8% 4.6% 11.2% 7.3% 7.3% 9.8% 5.2% 3.4% 12.9% 6.0% 
Nominee 
accounts 
1.2% 1.2% 0.9% 0.7% 1.6% 0.9% 1.1% 2.0% 2.1% 1.7% 1.7% 1.9% 
Institution 
total 
19.5% 14.6% 21.3% 16.2% 20.2% 19.7% 22.5% 19.7% 20.5% 22.4% 18.7% 17.9% 
Bank 1.5% 1.4% 1.6% 1.0% 1.5% 2.1% 1.8% 1.4% 1.9% 2.0% 1.6% 1.3% 
Insurance 
companies 
2.8% 1.6% 4.8% 2.9% 2.9% 3.1% 3.8% 2.4% 4.2% 4.6% 3.2% 2.7% 
Investment 
funds 
15.0% 11.5% 14.4% 12.1% 15.4% 14.2% 16.5% 15.7% 14.1% 14.6% 13.8% 13.7% 
Pension 
funds 
0.3% 0.2% 0.6% 0.2% 0.4% 0.3% 0.4% 0.2% 0.4% 1.2% 0.1% 0.2% 
Individual 1.3% 1.0% 1.8% 3.3% 2.3% 2.7% 2.2% 2.3% 1.7% 1.3% 3.5% 0.9% 
Industrial 
companies 
8.3% 12.4% 7.8% 8.5% 6.3% 10.2% 6.5% 11.8% 8.1% 6.8% 8.5% 9.5% 
Outside total 30.4% 29.2% 31.9% 28.7% 30.3% 33.4% 32.3% 35.7% 32.4% 32.2% 32.5% 30.3% 
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Table S1. Summary statistics of centrality measures (company level) 
This table summarizes the key centrality statistics (degree, closeness, betweenness and eigenvector centrality) of the companies in 
the sample. N stands for is the number of observations (firm-years). Note that the number of observations is smaller for the 
closeness measure as closeness measure cannot be calculated for isolated (non-networked) companies. SD stands for standard 
deviation. P25, P50 and P75 are the values at the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile. The summary statistics are calculated over all 
firm-years. Below each centrality measure is the normalized version denoted by “n”. The centrality measures are calculated using 
Matlab and Ucinet. Data source: Own calculations based on Manifest. 
 
Variable N Mean SD Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
degree 13854 4.02  3.88  0.00  1.00  3.00  6.00  29.00  
(n) degree 13854 0.35  0.36  0.00  0.09  0.26  0.52  3.49  
close 11319 448,512  381,822  133,702  247,103  290,541  617,579  2,340,900  
(n) closeness 11319 0.36  0.14  0.07  0.25  0.40  0.43  0.59  
eigen 13854 0.01  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.36  
(n) eigen 13854 1.94  3.68  0.00  0.00  0.48  2.25  50.23  
between 13854 1,402.96  2,359.46  0.00  0.00  349.90  1,838.89  28,711.68  
(n) between 13854 0.20  0.34  0.00  0.00  0.05  0.27  5.52  
 
Table S2. Summary statistics of centrality measures (company level) by year 
This table presents the annual average centrality measures on the company level over the sample period. In the first column are 
the names of different centrality measures, namely, degree, closeness, betweenness and eigen vector centrality. Below each 
centrality measure is the normalized version, denoted by “n”. The centrality measures are calculated using Matlab and Ucinet. 
Data source: Own calculations based on Manifest. 
 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
degree 3.99  4.11  4.25  4.11  4.16  4.40  4.28  4.20  4.01  3.77  3.71  3.63  
(n) degree 0.53  0.49  0.46  0.42  0.39  0.39  0.38  0.37  0.29  0.26  0.24  0.24  
close 156,205  166,495  202,946  233,054 306,080  321,953  324,680  351,209  566,905  709,816  728,352  802,400  
(n) closeness 0.53  0.56  0.53  0.48  0.41  0.40  0.39  0.38  0.28  0.23  0.24  0.22  
eigen 0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  
(n) eigen 2.48  2.61  2.37  2.32  2.04  2.10  2.35  1.79  1.83  1.74  1.52  1.13  
between 773.68  952.25  1,095.47  1,177.41  1,222.66  1,302.45  1,287.51  1,347.33  1,679.10  1,611.80  1,845.24  1,718.78  
(n) between 0.28  0.28  0.26  0.24  0.22  0.20  0.21  0.20  0.17  0.15  0.16  0.15  
 
Table S3. Summary statistics of centrality measures (company level) by company size 
The table below shows the centrality difference by firm size as proxied by index membership. In the first row are the names of 
different centrality measures, namely, degree, closeness, betweenness and eigenvector centrality. Below each centrality measure 
is the normalized version denoted by “n”. The centrality measures are calculated using Matlab and Ucinet. Data source: Own 
calculations based on Manifest. 
 
 degree (n) degree closeness (n) closeness eigen (n) eigen between (n) between 
FTSE 100 9.29  0.85  346,261  0.40  0.05  6.69  3,918.76  0.62  
FTSE 250 5.63  0.50  364,221  0.39  0.02  2.75  2,158.92  0.31  
FTSE SmallCap 3.64  0.32  403,238  0.38  0.01  1.45  1,136.87  0.16  
FTSE Fledgling 2.62  0.22  432,451  0.36  0.01  1.08  696.77  0.10  
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Table S4. Network component structure (company level) by year  
This table lists the average network component statistics over the sample period. Nr of obs. is the number of 
observations in each year. Density evaluates how many links actually exist on top of the theoretical maximum 
number of links in the graph. N link is the number of links present in that year. NC>3 gives the number of 
components with size above three in that year. Max C is the size of the biggest component in that year. These 
statistics are calculated using Matlab and Ucinet. Data source: Own calculations based on Manifest. 
 
 
Table S5. Network component structure (company level) by sector  
This table shows the component structure information by sector in 2007. In the first row, N link is the number 
of links present in that year. Degree (avg.) is the average degree of all companies. N C>3 gives the number of 
components with a size above three. Max C is the size of the biggest component. The centrality measures and 
structure statistics are calculated using Matlab and Ucinet. Data source: Own calculations based on Manifest. 
 
 N link Density Degree(avg.) Degree (sum) N C> 3 max C 
Financial 202 0.0057  1.15  232  5 75 
IT 197 0.0043  0.84  166  13 25 
Logistics 148 0.0041  0.61  90  7 17 
Energy 111 0.0051  0.56  62  7 6 
Industry 105 0.0029  0.31  32  3 6 
Medical 87 0.0094  0.81  70  4 13 
Leisure 78 0.0060  0.46  36  3 5 
Media 75 0.0054  0.40  30  4 3 
Mining 73 0.0095  0.69  50  3 12 
Retail 66 0.0061  0.39  26  4 4 
Food 45 0.0121  0.53  24  2 4 
 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Nr of obs. 749 832 915 984 1,065 1,133 1,117 1,151 1,400 1,449 1,528 1531 
Density 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 
N link 2990 3418 3888 4046 4434 4980 4780 4834 5610 5466 5676 5562 
N C>3 6 3 8 4 7 5 7 5 9 11 9 11 
Max C 573 664 739 786 836 896 877 902 1066 1052 1127 1101 
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Table S6. Networks of remuneration consultants 
This table shows the number of remuneration consultant links by company and by year. If a company does 
not hire a remuneration consultant, the value equals zero. If a company has more than one remuneration 
consultants, the sum of the links from the consultants is taken. Data source: Own calculations based on 
Manifest. 
 
 Mean SD Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
1996 19  37  0 0 0 24 218 
1997 19  37  0 0 0 22.5 218 
1998 18  35  0 0 0 18.5 218 
1999 19  35  0 0 0 20 220 
2000 19  36  0 0 0 24 222 
2001 23  40  0 0 0 31 242 
2002 55  76  0 0 11 94 434 
2003 79  94  0 0 36 152 554 
2004 59  81  0 0 2 123 382 
2005 53  74  0 0 0 136 324 
2006 46  66  0 0 0 96 291 
2007 39  60  0 0 0 60 276 
total 40  65  0 0 0 63 554 
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Appendix A . Variable definitions 
 
Variable Description Source 
Remuneration   
Total Sum of all remuneration items listed below. Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
Salary Fixed remuneration paid to executive directors Manifest 
Fee Fixed remuneration mainly paid to non-executive directors. Manifest 
Bonus Performance-related remuneration paid out annually Manifest 
Equity-based compensation Remuneration paid as restricted shares and stock options (valued by means of 
Black-Scholes formula) 
Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
Miscellaneous  Sum of transaction bonus, deferred cash bonus, severance pay, recruitment 
incentive and relocation fee 
Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
Other Sum of rare remuneration components such as e.g. medical insurance Manifest 
   
Performance indicator   
Return on asset Net income prior to financing costs divided by total assets then multiplied by 
100. 
Datastream 
Market-adjusted stock return Annual stock return minus the return of the FT All Share index  Own calculations 
based on Datastream 
   
Centrality measure   
Degree (ndegree) Number of links of a vertex.(normalized degree)  Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
Closeness (ncloseness) The inverse of the geodesic distance from a vertex to all reachable vertices. 
(normalized closeness) 
Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
Betweenness (nbetweenness) The probability that a specific vertex is on the geodesic path between any other 
two vertices. (normalized betweenness) 
Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
Eigenvector centrality 
(neigenvector)  
The aggregation of centralities of adjacent vertices. (normalized eigenvector) Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
   
CEO information   
Gender (male) Equals 1 if male and 0 if female. Manifest 
Tenure Number of years in current position Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
Committee membership Equals 2 if chairman of a specific committee, 1 if member, 0 if not member. Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
Chairmanship-CEO duality Equals 1 if the target CEO is also the chairman of the board, 0 otherwise. Manifest 
Notice period A minimum period a CEO must stay on post after giving his notice to his 
employer 
Manifest 
   
Board composition   
Prop. nonexecutive Proportion of non-executive directors on board (denominator is total board size) Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
Prop. female Proportion by female directors on board (denominator is total board size) Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
   
Remuneration consultant networks   
Size remuneration consultant 
network 
The number of firms to which a remuneration consultant gives advice  Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
   
Ownership structure   
CEO stock holding All the CEO’s stock holdings. Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
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Executive stock holding  The sum of all executive directors’ stock holdings. Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
Non executive stock holding The sum of all non-executive directors’ stock holdings. Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
Nominee account block holding The sum of the share stakes of 3% or more on nominee accounts.  Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
Institutional block holding The sum of the share stakes of 3% or more held by banks, insurance companies, 
pension funds and investment, and mutual funds. 
Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
Corporate block holding The sum of the share stakes of 3% or more held by industrial or commercial 
firms. 
Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
Individual block holding The sum of the share stakes of 3% or more held by individuals or families not 
related to a director. 
Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
   
Firm size, Capital structure and 
risk 
  
Total assets Sum of total current assets, long term receivables, investment in unconsolidated 
subsidiaries, other investments, net property plant and equipment and other 
assets, except for financial companies. 
Datastream 
Debt to asset ratio Sum of short term debt, current portion of long term debt and long term debt 
divided by total assets then multiplied by 100, except for financial companies. 
Datastream 
Stock price volatility The stock's average annual price movement to a high and low from a mean 
price for each year: (high-low)/(high+low). 
Own calculations 
based on Datastream 
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Appendix B. Top manager identification procedure 
For most firm-years in our sample, we have one unique CEO who serves as the top manager of the firm. 
Sometimes, however, two CEO are present, often at times prior to the departure of one CEO. In some small 
companies, we have no CEO but only managing director. For those firm-years, we use the following 
procedure to identify the non-CEO top manager, or the so-called CEO equivalent. We first check whether 
there is a CEO in the firm-year. If the answer is no, we take as CEO, the managing director, and in case 
there is no managing director, the executive chairman. If there are multiple managers present, we check 
how many of them remain in the company until the end of the year. If only one remains, he will be 
identified as the CEO/CEO-equivalent. This solves most of the multiple CEO cases. If more than one stay 
until year end, or all depart before the year end, we rely on their compensation level and choose the best 
paid CEO/CEO-equivalent. If they receive same pay, we pick one of them randomly and include him in our 
CEO sample. (In the graph, a star denotes a successful identification of CEO or CEO-equivalent which 
terminates the procedure). 
 
Figure Appendix B. This diagram shows the procedure of identifying the CEO or CEO equivalents in 
each firm-year. 
 
 
 83 
Appendix C. Sector classification 
Panel A shows the sector classification as obtained from Datastream and the frequency gives the number of 
firm-years that can be categorized in a specific sector. Panel B gives sector information for the year 2007. Panel 
C shows broad sector distribution in whole sample as well as 2007. 
 
Panel A 
 
(whole sample) Frequency Percentage Sector Frequency Percentage 
Aerospace & Defense 152 1.37 Industrial Metals & Mining 40 0.36 
Alternative Energy 54 0.49 Industrial Transportation 233 2.1 
Automobiles & Parts 62 0.56 Leisure Goods 94 0.85 
Banks 126 1.14 Life Insurance 101 0.91 
Beverages 97 0.87 Media 664 5.98 
Chemicals 199 1.79 Mining 329 2.97 
Construction & Materials 332 2.99 Mobile Telecommunications 40 0.36 
Electricity 86 0.78 Nonlife Insurance 231 2.08 
Electronic & Electrical Equipm 313 2.82 Oil & Gas Producers 337 3.04 
Equity Investment Instruments 26 0.23 Oil Equipment & Services 92 0.83 
Financial Services (Sector) 648 5.84 Personal Goods 149 1.34 
Fixed Line Telecommunications 132 1.19 Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnolog 456 4.11 
Food & Drug Retailers 137 1.23 Real Estate Investment & Servi 422 3.8 
Food Producers 241 2.17 Real Estate Investment Trusts 168 1.51 
Forestry & Paper 26 0.23 Software & Computer Services 945 8.52 
Gas, Water & Multiutilities 122 1.1 Support Services 1,193 10.75 
General Industrials 142 1.28 Technology Hardware & Equipmen 318 2.87 
General Retailers 656 5.91 Tobacco 35 0.32 
Health Care Equipment & Servic 228 2.05 Travel & Leisure 725 6.53 
Household Goods & Home Constru 345 3.11 Unclassified 16 0.14 
Industrial Engineering 384 3.46    
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Panel B 
(2007) Frequency Percentage Sector Frequency Percentage 
Aerospace & Defense 14 1.2 Industrial Metals & Mining 9 0.77 
Alternative Energy 11 0.95 Industrial Transportation 16 1.38 
Automobiles & Parts 4 0.34 Leisure Goods 6 0.52 
Banks 11 0.95 Life Insurance 11 0.95 
Beverages 6 0.52 Media 73 6.28 
Chemicals 15 1.29 Mining 67 5.76 
Construction & Materials 23 1.98 Mobile Telecommunications 4 0.34 
Electricity 11 0.95 Nonlife Insurance 21 1.81 
Electronic & Electrical Equipm 30 2.58 Oil & Gas Producers 60 5.16 
Equity Investment Instruments 5 0.43 Oil Equipment & Services 13 1.12 
Financial Services (Sector) 87 7.48 Personal Goods 11 0.95 
Fixed Line Telecommunications 8 0.69 Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnolog 51 4.39 
Food & Drug Retailers 8 0.69 Real Estate Investment & Servi 52 4.47 
Food Producers 24 2.06 Real Estate Investment Trusts 19 1.63 
Forestry & Paper 2 0.17 Software & Computer Services 97 8.34 
Gas, Water & Multiutilities 8 0.69 Support Services 137 11.78 
General Industrials 15 1.29 Technology Hardware & Equipmen 36 3.1 
General Retailers 51 4.39 Tobacco 3 0.26 
Health Care Equipment & Servic 27 2.32 Travel & Leisure 63 5.42 
Household Goods & Home Constru 19 1.63 Unclassified 1 0.09 
Industrial Engineering 34 2.92    
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Panel C  
 
 
 
Frequency 
(Whole sample) 
Percentage 
(Whole sample) 
Frequency 
(2007) 
Percentage 
(2007) 
Chemical 655 4.73 66 4.31 
Communication 172 1.24 12 0.78 
Financial 1,722 12.43 206 13.46 
Food 510 3.68 41 2.68 
It 1,670 12.05 169 11.04 
Leisure 725 5.23 63 4.11 
Logistics 1,426 10.29 153 9.99 
Media 664 4.79 73 4.77 
Manufacture 1,467 10.59 168 10.97 
Other 3,496 25.23 426 27.82 
Retailer 656 4.74 51 3.33 
Utility 691 4.99 103 6.73 
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Appendix D: CEO, executive and non-executive director remuneration by corporate size  
 
Table D1. FTSE 100 CEO remuneration 
This table shows the CEO total remuneration and its components for FTSE100 companies. N is the number of observations 
(firm-years). Mean stands for the average value; SD is the standard deviation. P25 and P75 are the value at the first and third 
quartile, respectively. Percent captures the percentage of the total remuneration that is awarded via this type of remuneration. The 
values in bold are unconditional statistics, which takes into account all variables with a zero value. The other values are 
conditional statistics based on non-zero values only. N (the number of observations) always equals to maximum number of 
observations possible for the unconditional statistics. The N for the conditional statistics is the number of firm years when a 
certain type of remuneration is actually given. Data source: Own calculations based on data from Manifest and Datastream. 
 
Variable N Mean SD Min P25 Median P75 Max Percent 
Total salary 1276  553802  261108  0  390000  537749  711686  2147200  23.73% 
Salary cash 344  707690  242201  2692  550000  707000  864522  1531000   
Salary shares 3  2997  4  2993  2993  2997  3000  3000   
Total fees 1276  4536  138522  0  0  0  0  4939000  2.20% 
Fees cash 0  . . . . . . .  
Fees shares 0  . . . . . . .  
Total bonus 1276  506949  766244  0  100000  264107  619141  8451275  21.72% 
Bonus cash 1046  517928  680161  3365  159000  307100  623000  7351275   
Bonus shares 15  334269  424955  2658  60000  230000  518923  1715000   
Bonus vdf 22  490862  354101  76760  204220  406000  666908  1259370   
Bonus mdf 149  545083  616004  18750  173962  335187  630000  3837500   
Total equity 1,276  1,174,156  2,260,997  0  0  475,002  1,351,518  26,700,000  50.30% 
Restricted share 725  1,373,217  2,180,412  330  303,298  702,884  1,640,211  26,700,000   
Stock option 527  953,777  1,675,824  0  264,003  500,386  1,008,102  23,400,000   
Total misc 1276  15217  131543  0  0  0  0  3062944  0.65% 
Transaction Bonus 2  929000  1231780  58000  58000  929000  1800000  1800000   
Deferred Cash Bonus 17  264845  175277  16000  152069  218750  470878  505039   
Loss of Office  10  595993  341766  103000  403799  588500  875000  1057971   
Recruitment Incentive 6  858101  1194629  4556  53737  342500  1342372  3062943   
Reallocation expenses 10  194830  146358  39479  99836  130055  259749  447469   
Others 1276  79468  238881  0  14702  25330  62000  6624000  3.40% 
Overall total 1,276  2,334,128  2,812,143  0  796,093  1,442,278  2,853,719  31,000,000  100% 
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Table D2. FTSE 100 Executive remuneration (excluding the CEO)  
This table shows the CEO total remuneration and its components for FTSE100 companies. N is the number of observations 
(firm-years). Mean stands for the average value; SD is the standard deviation. P25 and P75 are the value at the first and third 
quartile, respectively. Percent captures the percentage of the total remuneration that is awarded via this type of remuneration.  
The values in bold are unconditional statistics, which takes into account all variables with a zero value. The other values are 
conditional statistics based on non-zero values only. N (the number of observations) always equals to maximum number of 
observations possible for the unconditional statistics. The N for the conditional statistics is the number of firm years when a 
certain type of remuneration is actually given. Source: Own calculations based on data from Manifest and Datastream. 
 
Variable N Mean SD Min P25 Median P75 Max Percent 
Total salary 5825 303,739  182,630  0  188,387  281,000  390,000  2,609,000  29.56% 
Salary cash 1122 394,410  196,378  954  270,000  381,000  500,000  2,609,000   
Salary shares 6 2,997  3  2,993  2,993  2,997  3,000  3,000   
Total fees 5825 976  13,433  0  0  0  0  483,000  0.09% 
Fees cash 5 214,685  182,891  8,000  93,696  207,731  281,000  483,000   
Fees shares 0 . . . . . . .  
Total bonus 5825 220,285  480,961  0  21,000  101,000  244,000  17,900,000  21.44% 
Bonus cash 4522 245,326  411,154  0  68,031  135,000  266,000  10,400,000   
Bonus shares 45 101,884  102,691  0  18,000  75,000  162,930  362,376   
Bonus vdf 81 214,615  203,956  0  72,000  177,000  295,000  939,000   
Bonus mdf 479 284,823  601,263  0  78,000  148,000  322,000  11,400,000   
Total equity 5825 428,194  1,699,809  0  0  143,323  494,998  112,000,000  41.67% 
Restricted share 2661 607,241  2,321,240  25  122,497  323,409  664,998  112,000,000   
Stock option 2149 408,730  771,622  0  139,740  251,583  455,881  25,100,000   
Total misc 5825 21,751  219,060  0  0  0  0  10,700,000  2.12% 
Transaction Bonus 10 289,130  172,387  80,000  200,000  207,500  415,000  645,000   
Deferred Cash Bonus 46 142,339  155,792  4,000  34,000  77,175  219,605  545,901   
Loss of Office  139 782,251  1,140,080  0  331,003  515,000  790,000  10,700,000   
Recruitment Incentive 17 440,728  791,155  1,245  100,000  233,000  400,000  3,408,000   
Reallocation expenses 15 69,047  71,116  4,870  19,722  35,917  95,558  259,749   
Others 5825 52,674  192,396  0  10,000  17,000  34,000  9,538,471  5.13% 
Overall total 5825 1,027,620  1,957,499  0  356,000  649,908  1,231,688  112,000,000  100% 
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Table D3 FTSE 100 non-executives’ remuneration 
Table 4.3.8 shows non- executives’ total remuneration and its components of FTSE100 companies. N is the number of 
observations (firm-years). Mean stands for the average value; SD is the standard deviation. P25 and P75 are the value at the first 
and third quartile, respectively. Percent captures the percentage of the total remuneration that is awarded via this type of 
remuneration.  The values in bold are unconditional statistics, which takes into account all variables with a zero value. The other 
values are conditional statistics based on non-zero values only. N (the number of observations) always equals to maximum 
number of observations possible for the unconditional statistics. The N for the conditional statistics is the number of firm years 
when a certain type of remuneration is actually given. Data source: Own calculations based on data from Manifest and 
Datastream. 
 
Variable N Mean SD Min P25 Median P75 Max Percent 
Total salary 9962 3,483  37,609  0  0  0  0  1,065,526  4.74% 
Salary cash 7 245,754  192,981  53,091  80,862  212,037  407,545  570,322   
Salary shares 0 . . . . . . .  
Total fees 9962 57,560  71,895  0  25,000  37,500  60,000  1,100,000  78.33% 
Fees cash 2605 85,945  94,483  0  44,000  58,113  85,000  1,100,000   
Fees shares 98 24,534  30,740  0  7,500  20,000  25,000  175,000   
Total bonus 9962 2,012  63,995  0  0  0  0  5,531,744  2.74% 
Bonus cash 72 253,941  616,916  601  25,000  87,750  201,593  4,811,743   
Bonus shares 0 . . . . . . .  
Bonus vdf 0 . . . . . . .  
Bonus mdf 5 352,259  288,804  45,780  72,706  426,100  496,707  720,000   
Total equity 9962 5,414  114,361  0  0  0  0  6,662,728  7.37% 
Restricted share 36 978,319  1,138,193  1,506  285,112  486,473  1,096,970  4,243,383   
Stock option 64 292,496  582,766  0  57,402  115,958  241,039  3,393,328   
Total misc 9962 493  18,975  0  0  0  0  1,230,000  0.67% 
Transaction Bonus 0 . . . . . . .  
Deferred Cash Bonus 1 35,000  . 35,000  35,000  35,000  35,000  35,000   
Loss of Office  11 443,295  377,643  23,000  105,678  403,799  628,528  1,230,000   
Recruitment Incentive 0 . . . . . . .  
Reallocation expenses 0 . . . . . . .  
Others 9962 4,520  105,982  0  0  0  0  9,157,000  6.15% 
Overall total 9962 73,483  211,035  0  25,000  39,508  65,000  9,188,000  100% 
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Table D4. FTSE 250 CEO remuneration 
Table 4.3.9 shows CEO total remuneration and its components of FTSE250 companies. N is the number of observations 
(firm-years). Mean stands for the average value; SD is the standard deviation. P25 and P75 are the value at the first and third 
quartile, respectively. Percent captures the percentage of the total remuneration that is awarded via this type of remuneration.  
The values in bold are unconditional statistics, which takes into account all variables with a zero value. The other values are 
conditional statistics based on non-zero values only. N (the number of observations) always equals to maximum number of 
observations possible for the unconditional statistics. The N for the conditional statistics is the number of firm years when a 
certain type of remuneration is actually given. Data source: Own calculations based on data from Manifest and Datastream. 
 
Variable N Mean SD Min P25 Median P75 Max Percent 
Total salary 3386  285,105  184,419  0  170,000  295,000  400,000  2,400,000  28.56% 
Salary cash 785  409,363  149,932  2,692  318,475  400,000  487,600  1,147,945   
Salary shares 0  . . . . . . .  
Total fees 3386  3,246  15,269  0  0  0  0  337,000  0.34% 
Fees cash 105  40,880  40,270  4,000  24,000  27,500  35,000  221,000   
Fees shares 0  . . . . . . .  
Total bonus 3386  194,164  398,354  0  0  85,250  236,539  5,740,000  19.45% 
Bonus cash 2277  251,498  363,406  130  77,000  153,000  291,000  4,500,000   
Bonus shares 28  259,592  386,716  41,824  100,256  136,559  199,500  1,968,750   
Bonus vdf 39  237,555  247,029  12,680  76,760  159,000  340,000  1,312,500   
Bonus mdf 183  298,009  422,037  2,296  92,000  166,000  300,000  2,870,000   
Total equity 3,386  467,380  4,191,657  0  0  26,802  367,290  186,841,117  46.81% 
Restricted share 1,150  823,644  4,270,988  330  174,998  361,302  652,041  134,000,000   
Stock option 929  782,499  9,267,125  0  124,516  221,358  397,114  186,841,117   
Total misc 3386  14,060  182,179  0  0  0  0  6,333,880  1.41% 
Transaction Bonus 13  1,085,083  1,316,301  58,000  156,250  505,104  1,760,934  4,686,697   
Deferred Cash Bonus 27  410,860  1,201,322  8,000  49,000  117,413  267,347  6,333,880   
Loss of Office  16  650,106  432,912  103,000  382,418  464,875  838,434  1,544,745   
Recruitment Incentive 13  899,279  1,044,107  150,000  350,000  508,055  735,514  3,225,044   
Reallocation expenses 4  79,277  59,181  35,000  39,338  58,838  119,216  164,431   
Others 3386  34,429  90,292  0  3,807  16,000  27,000  2,179,000  3.45% 
Overall total 3,386  998,383  4,273,865  0  274,000  561,655  1,060,530  186,879,117  100% 
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Table D5. FTSE 250 Executive remuneration (excluding the CEO) 
Table 4.3.10 shows non-CEO executives’ total remuneration and its components of FTSE250 companies. N is the 
number of observations. Mean is the average value of the variable. SD stands for standard deviation. Min and Max 
are the minimum and maximum value of the item. P25 and P75 are the value at 25% quantile and 75% quantile 
respectively. The percentage at the last column is how many percent of total remuneration is awarded in that type of 
remuneration. All the values are unconditional. Data source: Own calculations based on data from Manifest and 
Datastream. 
 
variable N mean sd min p25 Median p75 max Percent 
Total salary 11091 186,054  109,602  0  115,454  176,000  245,000  2,045,400  32.97% 
Total fees 11091 738  12,466  0  0  0  0  575,000  0.13% 
Total bonus 11091 108,542  259,380  0  0  47,000  121,000  9,925,000  19.23% 
Total equity 11091 227,703  2,583,158  0  0  8,019  178,725  209,000,000  40.35% 
Total misc 11091 13,577  126,150  0  0  0  0  6,076,200  2.41% 
Others 11091 27,771  123,546  0  6,706  13,000  21,000  9,538,471  4.92% 
Overall total 11091 564,386  2,621,771  0  194,200  338,335  592,000  209,000,000  100% 
 
Table D6. FTSE 250 non-executives’ remuneration 
Table 4.3.11 shows non-executives’ total remuneration and its components of FTSE250 companies. N is the number 
of observations. Mean is the average value of the variable. SD stands for standard deviation. Min and Max are the 
minimum and maximum value of the item. P25 and P75 are the value at 25% quantile and 75% quantile 
respectively. The percentage at the last column is how many percent of total remuneration is awarded in that type of 
remuneration. All the values are unconditional. Data source: Own calculations based on data from Manifest and 
Datastream. 
 
variable N mean sd min p25 Median p75 max Percent 
Total salary 18775 1,758  21,259  0  0  0  0  875,000  4.16% 
Total fees 18775 34,250  37,761  0  15,000  25,000  38,000  705,000  81.03% 
Total bonus 18775 1,129  24,265  0  0  0  0  1,800,000  2.67% 
Total equity 18775 2,516  68,065  0  0  0  0  6,662,728  5.95% 
Total misc 18775 832  95,401  0  0  0  0  13,100,000  1.97% 
Others 18775 1,784  20,609  0  0  0  0  1,111,942  4.22% 
Overall total 18775 42,269  142,559  0  16,000  26,000  40,000  14,300,000  100% 
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Table D7. FTSE SmallCap CEO remuneration 
Table 4.3.12 shows CEO total remuneration and its components of FTSE SmallCap companies. N is the number of observations 
(firm-years). Mean stands for the average value; SD is the standard deviation. P25 and P75 are the value at the first and third 
quartile, respectively. Percent captures the percentage of the total remuneration that is awarded via this type of remuneration. The 
values in bold are unconditional statistics, which takes into account all variables with a zero value. The other values are 
conditional statistics based on non-zero values only. N (the number of observations) always equals to maximum number of 
observations possible for the unconditional statistics. The N for the conditional statistics is the number of firm years when a 
certain type of remuneration is actually given. Data source: Own calculations based on data from Manifest and Datastream. 
 
Variable N Mean SD Min P25 Median P75 Max Percent 
Total salary 4662  166,136  139,268  0  0  170,000  250,000  2,248,685  34.33% 
Salary cash 852  274,444  140,894  1,846  200,133  270,000  330,000  2,248,685   
Salary shares 2  5,000  0  5,000  5,000  5,000  5,000  5,000   
Total fees 4662  4,946  20,826  0  0  0  0  992,673  1.02% 
Fees cash 342  27,009  23,719  2,000  19,500  23,000  27,000  237,118   
Fees shares 1  755,555  . 755,555  755,555  755,555  755,555  755,555   
Total bonus 4662  71,821  150,015  0  0  7,488  95,000  2,500,000  14.84% 
Bonus cash 2364  135,212  178,816  623  44,000  90,000  165,000  2,500,000   
Bonus shares 15  103,320  125,764  3,000  41,200  63,654  122,057  510,000   
Bonus vdf 19  97,092  70,247  6,445  55,000  90,000  118,025  337,500   
Bonus mdf 65  123,245  133,262  3,000  52,286  84,500  138,000  835,000   
Total equity 4,662  216,148  3,291,035  0  0  0  51,864  186,841,117  44.66% 
Restricted share 713  526,324  2,150,374  2  120,666  234,242  376,623  47,600,000   
Stock option 715  1,012,584  11,200,000  0  69,124  144,588  272,851  186,841,117   
Total misc 4662  5,438  67,145  0  0  0  0  2,057,000  1.12% 
Transaction Bonus 7  651,943  775,097  49,428  60,500  187,671  1,246,000  2,057,000   
Deferred Cash Bonus 20  234,708  382,432  573  100,125  138,000  209,750  1,818,000   
Loss of Office  29  467,742  351,000  125,000  248,000  390,000  470,000  1,544,745   
Recruitment Incentive 10  227,846  198,186  48,000  87,500  137,500  400,000  600,000   
Reallocation expenses 5  49,946  40,543  14,002  25,915  36,813  56,000  117,000   
Others 4662  19,474  58,362  0  0  10,920  19,000  1,396,000  4.02% 
Overall total 4,662  483,963  3,308,147  0  40,000  254,056  486,003  186,879,117  100.00% 
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Table D8. FTSE SmallCap Executive remuneration (excluding the CEO) 
Table 4.3.13 shows non-CEO executives’ total remuneration and its components of FTSE SmallCap companies. N is 
the number of observations. Mean is the average value of the variable. SD stands for standard deviation. Min and 
Max are the minimum and maximum value of the item. P25 and P75 are the value at 25% quantile and 75% quantile 
respectively. The percentage at the last column is how many percent of total remuneration is awarded in that type of 
remuneration.  All the values are unconditional Data source: Own calculations based on data from Manifest and 
Datastream. 
 
Variable N Mean SD Min P25 Median P75 Max Percent 
Total salary 11708 129,829  75,492  0  82,000  122,000  170,000  933,712  36.15% 
Total fees 11708 1,124  21,335  0  0  0  0  1,029,013  0.31% 
Total bonus 11708 48,935  111,688  0  0  16,000  56,390  4,000,000  13.63% 
Total equity 11708 147,199  2,593,178  0  0  0  41,555  209,000,000  40.99% 
Total misc 11708 8,827  65,709  0  0  0  0  2,192,000  2.46% 
Others 11708 23,235  92,452  0  3,942  10,000  16,000  3,087,696  6.47% 
Overall total 11708 359,149  2,605,364  0  121,000  192,000  323,100  209,000,000  100% 
 
Table D9. FTSE SmallCap non-executives’ remuneration 
Table 4.3.14 shows non-executives’ total remuneration and its components of FTSE SmallCap companies. N is the 
number of observations. Mean is the average value of the variable. SD stands for standard deviation. Min and Max 
are the minimum and maximum value of the item. P25 and P75 are the value at 25% quantile and 75% quantile 
respectively. The percentage at the last column is how many percent of total remuneration is awarded in that type of 
remuneration. All the values are unconditional. Data source: Own calculations based on data from Manifest and 
Datastream. 
 
Variable N Mean SD Min P25 Median P75 Max Percent 
Total salary 20878 1,104  20,524  0  0  0  0  2,193,000  3.89% 
Total fees 20878 23,451  27,939  0  10,672  18,371  28,000  1,685,000  82.60% 
Total bonus 20878 428  9,799  0  0  0  0  673,120  1.51% 
Total equity 20878 1,970  99,145  0  0  0  0  13,000,000  6.94% 
Total misc 20878 192  7,180  0  0  0  0  606,000  0.67% 
Others 20878 1,248  21,027  0  0  0  0  1,818,000  4.39% 
Overall total 20878 28,392  111,078  0  11,000  19,679  29,350  13,000,000  100% 
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Table D.10 FTSE Fledgling CEO remuneration 
Table 4.3.15 shows CEO total remuneration and its components of FTSE Fledgling companies. N is the number of observations 
(firm-years). Mean stands for the average value; SD is the standard deviation. P25 and P75 are the value at the first and third 
quartile, respectively. Percent captures the percentage of the total remuneration that is awarded via this type of remuneration. The 
values in bold are unconditional statistics, which takes into account all variables with a zero value. The other values are 
conditional statistics based on non-zero values only. N (the number of observations) always equals to maximum number of 
observations possible for the unconditional statistics. The N for the conditional statistics is the number of firm years when a 
certain type of remuneration is actually given. Data source: Own calculations based on data from Manifest and Datastream. 
 
Variable N Mean SD Min P25 Median P75 Max Percent 
Total salary 2705  108,556  98,259  0  0  114,000  174,000  757,000  46.20% 
Salary cash 374  192,136  89,549  2,000  142,000  186,119  235,000  757,000   
Salary shares 1  22,000  . 22,000  22,000  22,000  22,000  22,000   
Total fees 2705  4,358  12,818  0  0  0  0  250,000  1.85% 
Fees cash 170  24,731  26,439  3,750  17,000  20,000  23,500  216,666   
Fees shares 0  . . . . . . .  
Total bonus 2705  27,371  68,414  0  0  0  27,000  1,100,000  11.65% 
Bonus cash 964  75,034  94,450  1,000  24,188  48,076  90,500  1,100,000   
Bonus shares 4  87,000  84,735  40,000  43,000  47,000  131,000  214,000   
Bonus vdf 1  105,000  . 105,000  105,000  105,000  105,000  105,000   
Bonus mdf 5  213,957  215,192  20,787  35,500  122,500  430,000  461,000   
Total equity 2705  76,496  932,563  0  0  0  0  42,900,000  32.56% 
Restricted share 184  442,470  1,235,139  1,688  77,589  178,867  311,250  11,000,000   
Stock option 352  351,308  2,376,255  0  29,957  78,935  178,590  42,900,000   
Total misc 2705  3,182  45,715  0  0  0  0  2,000,000  1.35% 
Transaction Bonus 2  1,012,507  1,396,526  25,014  25,014  1,012,507  2,000,000  2,000,000   
Deferred Cash Bonus 5  56,124  19,394  27,618  45,000  64,000  71,000  73,000   
Loss of Office  24  214,398  97,523  50,000  156,500  198,000  255,000  438,000   
Recruitment Incentive 4  129,491  47,365  85,000  98,482  118,482  160,500  196,000   
Reallocation expenses 4  159,501  229,187  14,002  24,501  62,000  294,500  500,000   
Others 2705  14,990  94,346  0  0  6,000  14,818  4,248,000  6.38% 
Overall total 2705  234,954  963,678  0  18,750  145,000  255,434  43,300,000  100.00% 
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Table D.11 FTSE Fledgling Executive remuneration (excluding the CEO) 
Table 4.3.16 shows non-CEO executives’ total remuneration and its components of FTSE Fledgling companies. N is 
the number of observations. Mean is the average value of the variable. SD stands for standard deviation. Min and 
Max are the minimum and maximum value of the item. P25 and P75 are the value at 25% quantile and 75% quantile 
respectively. The percentage at the last column is how many percent of total remuneration is awarded in that type of 
remuneration.  All the values are unconditional.  Data source: Own calculations based on data from Manifest and 
Datastream. 
 
Variable N Mean SD Min P25 Median P75 Max Percent 
Total salary 5835 95,226  63,539  0  56,250  90,000  126,000  702,419  49.44% 
Total fees 5835 609  6,917  0  0  0  0  196,000  0.32% 
Total bonus 5835 17,208  46,960  0  0  0  20,000  1,037,080  8.93% 
Total equity 5835 57,054  611,070  0  0  0  0  28,600,000  29.62% 
Total misc 5835 7,565  49,437  0  0  0  0  1,247,000  3.93% 
Others 5835 14,950  48,162  0  1,987  8,000  13,000  1,424,110  7.76% 
Overall total 5835 192,612  627,990  0  77,000  123,000  194,000  28,800,000  100% 
 
Table D12. FTSE Fledgling non-executives’ remuneration 
Table 4.3.17 shows non-executives’ total remuneration and its components of FTSE Fledgling companies. N is the 
number of observations. Mean is the average value of the variable. SD stands for standard deviation. Min and Max 
are the minimum and maximum value of the item. P25 and P75 are the value at 25% quantile and 75% quantile 
respectively. The percentage at the last column is how many percent of total remuneration is awarded in that type of 
remuneration.  All the values are unconditional. Data source: Own calculations based on data from Manifest and 
Datastream. 
 
Variable N Mean SD Min P25 Median P75 Max Percent 
Total salary 10336 1,036  12,605  0  0  0  0  450,000  3.75% 
Total fees 10336 20,926  291,453  0  8,254  15,000  22,500  29,600,000  75.87% 
Total bonus 10336 320  6,436  0  0  0  0  264,000  1.16% 
Total equity 10336 4,333  163,894  0  0  0  0  13,000,000  15.71% 
Total misc 10336 190  7,790  0  0  0  0  606,000  0.69% 
Others 10336 776  8,011  0  0  0  0  358,000  2.81% 
Overall total 10336 27,581  337,079  0  9,000  15,000  24,000  29,800,000  100% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
i In our regression analysis, we assume the error terms to be independent across firms, but not necessarily 
so across time. We have adjusted all the standard errors for clustering (StataCorp, 2001), which guarantees 
the validity of our result from regressions with panel data techniques. We also use the type-2 Tobit model 
(Heckman, 1979) to make sure the estimates are consistent. 
